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INTRODUCTION
Under the Federal Constitution's Supremacy Clause,' Congress has the
power to preempt state and local laws, rendering them "null, void, invalid and
inoperative."' Congress often exercises this power by adopting statutory provi-
1. U.S. ConsT. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. .. , shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
2. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 279 (1987) (internal quotation




sions that expressly preempt certain forms of state or local regulation.3 The tra-
ditional answer to whether federal preemption treats state law and local (city or
county) law the same has been an unequivocal yes.
This Article lifts the lid on that assumption of equal treatment to see
whether Congress actually differentiates between state and local laws in the fed-
eral preemption context-and to ask whether it should do so. Perhaps the City
of New Orleans should be allowed to escape federal preemption more easily
than the State of Louisiana in order to encourage local experimentation, or be-
cause a single local law will have less impact on federal uniformity interests than
a state law will. Or perhaps Louisiana should have more leeway than New Orle-
ans because states are considered sovereigns in our federalist system4 and local
governments are not,5 or because we have only fifty states but thousands of local
governments (about 3000 counties or county equivalents, 6 16,500 towns,7 and
Introduction to FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES' POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 3
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) ("The vast judicial office of
federal preemption is perched atop a single constitutional provision . . . ."). De-
bate exists over the relevance of other provisions to the preemption power. See,
e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Congress's Power To Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV.
39, 49 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Michele E. Gilman, Presidents, Preemption, and the States, 26 CONST.
COMMENT. 339, 364 (2010) ("[Al bevy of federal laws contain preemption provi-
sions, state mandates, and other policies that limit state authority .... ); cf Wil-
liam W. Buzbee, Introduction to PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND
REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION io (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009)
[hereinafter Buzbee, Introduction] (noting that "nonpreemptive regimes," howev-
er, "remain the dominant political choice"); William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors,
Ceilings, and the Benefits of Federalism's Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE, supra, at 98, 1oo & n.4 [hereinafter Buzbee, Federal Floors] (noting that,
despite its ability to preempt state and local regulation, Congress usually chooses
nonpreemption and prefers "multiple levels of regulators").
4. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) ("As every schoolchild learns,
our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and
the Federal Government."); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (referring to
federalism as a "system of dual sovereignty").
5. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 838 P.2d 1198,
1205 (Cal. 1992) ("In our federal system the states are sovereign but cities and
counties are not; in California as elsewhere they are mere creatures of the state
and exist only at the state's sufferance."); David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the
New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 390 (2001) ("As a formal legal matter, the federal
Constitution does not treat local governments as anything approximating coequal
sovereigns.").
6. Domestic Names: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
http://geonames.usgs.gov/domestic/faqs.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2011).
7. RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
12 (7th ed. 2009) (citing 2002 census data).
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20,000 cities),' meaning that local laws could have a greater cumulative effect
on federal interests than state laws would.
I conclude that Congress distinguishes the state from the local more often
than is commonly understood. Further, Congress is justified in doing so on
both constitutional and policy grounds. Indeed, Congress should think even
more systematically and regularly about state-local differences than it currently
does when drafting preemption provisions.
The newness of this line of inquiry is surprising. State and local govern-
ments differ dramatically in ways relevant to preemption doctrine. Moreover,
federal preemption statutes and federal preemption cases are pervasive. Federal
statutes have been crisscrossed with preemption provisions, with no sign of
abatement. By 2004, Congress had enacted 522 preemption statutes9-statutes
that declare certain forms of subfederal law prohibited. That number rose to 681
by 2011."
And federal preemption is "almost certainly the most frequently used doc-
trine of constitutional law in practice."" Federal preemption challenges over the
last decade have addressed issues ranging from health care, labor, employment,
and banking to telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, securi-
ties, transportation, foreign affairs, and occupational health and safety-and
even to habeas corpus" and meat inspection." High-profile cases include the
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Government Organization, [1] 2002 CENSUS GOVERNMENTS
(2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/20o3pubs/gco21xi.pdf.
9. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION: REGULATORY FEDERALISM
1 (2005) (providing data back to 1790); see also, e.g., id. at 5 ("[O]nly twenty-nine
such statutes [were] enacted by 1900 .... ); id. at 7 (describing the "federalism
revolution" after 1965).
10. E-mail from Joseph Zimmerman, Professor, State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, to au-
thor (Jan. 12, 2012, 3:23 PM EST) (on file with author).
11. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768
(1994); see also Buzbee, Introduction, supra note 3, at i (noting that "[d]ebates over
the federal government's preemption power rage" in Congress, agencies, and
courts); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L.
REV. 727, 730 (2008) ("Preemption is one of the most widely applied doctrines in
public law, yet it remains surprisingly underanalyzed."); Jamelle C. Sharpe, To-
ward (a) Faithful Agency in the Supreme Court's Preemption Jurisprudence, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 367, 367 (2011) ("Preemption has become one of the most fre-
quently recurring and perplexing public law issues facing the federal courts to-
day."). But see Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities
and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2011) (discussing the vigorous labor activity at
state and local levels through private arrangements, despite the looming threat of
preemption).
12. See United States v. Pleau, Nos. 11-1775, 11-1782, 2on WL 640o651 (1st Cir. Dec. 21,
2011) (en banc) (agreeing to rehear a decision finding preemption under the Inter-
state Agreement on Detainers Act).




challenges to state14 and local" efforts to regulate the presence of undocumented
immigrants, with Arizona's laws currently the most prominent. The Second
Circuit recently held that federal law preempted New York City's latest effort to
encourage the development of hybrid taxis." And the Ninth Circuit recently
struck down as preempted the Port of Los Angeles' regulations converting driv-
ers from independent contractors to employees. 7
Many scholars just ignore the local entirely when discussing federal
preemption. Even when others acknowledge that federal law preempts local as
well as state regulation, they generally do not pry the local apart from the state."
Instead, they use the phrase "state and local" reflexively or talk about the local
without applying a comparative lens.'9 The three major recent volumes on fed-
eral preemption almost entirely gloss over the local.20 This conflation tracks the
tendency in federalism theory-the umbrella under which preemption theory
14. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding part
of the Legal Arizona Workers Act); United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir.
2011) (striking down sections of Arizona's immigration law, S.B. 1070), cert. grant-
ed, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011).
15. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010); Michael A. Oli-
vas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and
the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27; Mark S. Grube, Note,
Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. City of Hazleton: Reconciling
Local Enforcement with Federal Immigration Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2010);
see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 1o8 COLUM. L. REV.
2037, 2081-83 (20o8) (identifying the different experiences of immigration regula-
tion at the state versus local level, particularly in the context of the integration of
immigrants).
16. Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (ap-
plying the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1569
(2011); see also, e.g., Jonathan Skinner, Who Killed the Hybrid Car? State and Local
Green Incentive Programs after Metropolitan Taxicab Board of Trade v. City of
New York in the Second Circuit, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 311 (2011).
17. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 660 F.3d 384, 407-08 (9th Cir. 2011)
(finding preemption under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization
Act).
18. See, e.g., Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of Local Efforts To Protect the Environment:
Implications for Local Government Officials, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 467 (1999).
19. See, e.g., THOMAS 0. McGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR: WHEN FEDERAL Bu-
REAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES 242-43 (2008) (making no distinctions be-
tween state and local laws when lauding the virtues of nonfederal regulation);
Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 572 (2010) (not
discussing the difference).
20. See FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 2; McGARITY, supra note 19; PREEMPTION
CHOICE, supra note 3.
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falls"-to focus on federal-state regulations.2 2 Mark Gordon provides a major
exception. He argues as part of a broader agenda that Congress should "consid-
er more explicitly the role played by local governments as distinct from states in
the federal relationship."2 3
Part I sets the stage by identifying the foundations of state-local conflation
for preemption purposes and tracing its trajectory in judicial and congressional
practice. I first show how the Constitution's silence on local governance gave
rise to an understanding of local governments as subordinates to the states.
That understanding in turn spawned the assumption that local governments are
indistinguishable from the states for purposes of federal preemption. Turning
to the judiciary, I identify two major doctrinal rules that merge the local into
the state for purposes of federal preemption: what I call the "conflation axiom,"
and a default rule of merger when Congress has saved state law from preemp-
tion but is silent on local outcomes. Yet the courts at times will treat state and
local laws differently for purposes of federal preemption in ways unacknowl-
edged by those doctrines or the literature on local government or federalism. I
then move beyond the literature and the doctrine, inspecting the preemption
provisions in thirteen leading federal environmental and health and safety stat-
utes to determine what Congress is actually doing.14 I find that Congress al-
ready-albeit unsystematically-takes state-local differences into account more
than is assumed.
21. Ernest Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION,
supra note 2, at 249, 269 (stating that "'the true test of federalist principle' comes
in preemption cases" (quoting Egelhoffv. Egelhoffex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 160
(2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting))); see also, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
405 (1817) (" [T]he conflicting powers of the general and state governments must
be brought into view.. .. "); Jonathan D. Varat, Federalism and Preemption in Oc-
tober Term 1999, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 757, 758 (2001) (noting that preemption is, "in a
sense, a microcosm of federalism and separation of powers debates").
22. See, e.g., Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 3, at 13, 13 (discussing "the distri-
bution of power between the federal government and state governments"); cf Da-
vid J. Barron, Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 2 (2009) ("Federalism ... refers only to a particular form of decen-
tralization. It favors states, not cities.").
23. See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Ap-
proach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 190
(1996). While Congress might "stress[] the importance of local decision-making"
in some legislative debates, "specific proposals have overwhelmingly sought to
transfer power to the states." Id. at 209. The background history of urban prob-
lems that have been viewed as appropriate for direct federal attention is a fascinat-
ing one, beginning with efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, when the federal govern-
ment established direct connection with cities, and into the 1990s, when the states
emerged triumphant.




Part II tackles a vexing threshold question: whether Congress even has the
power to enact preemption provisions that differentiate between the state and
the local. This question is particularly vexing when Congress seeks to constrain
state power but to liberate local authority. Going to the heart of the relative fed-
eral and state power over local governments, the question becomes: Can Con-
gress as well as the states decide how much power local governments can wield?
If so, when can Congress interfere? I argue that Congress has the power to inter-
fere with state-local relations if it clearly states its intentions to do so.
Parts I and II establish that Congress has the necessary tools and powers to
distinguish the local from the state in preemption provisions, despite the pre-
vailing assumption of equivalency. Part III then argues that Congress should
seize the opportunity to think more systematically about state-local differences
when drafting preemption provisions. This Part sets out a framework to govern
that process. In particular, I argue that Congress should consider the relative
value of state versus local law according to seven variables, which range from
maintaining federal uniformity and encouraging innovation to reducing the ex-
portation of burdens to other jurisdictions. Even mere deliberation about these
questions, I argue, will produce a range of benefits for federal law and intergov-
ernmental relations.
Part IV identifies mechanisms that can assist Congress in the project of dif-
ferentiating the local from the state for purposes of federal preemption. I pro-
pose steps that Congress can take to mitigate the impacts of its decisions on
state authority. In turn, courts can participate in the project by applying a
plain-statement rule when interpreting federal preemption clauses-those
clauses that prohibit (as opposed to save) subfederal regulation. The rule would
be that if Congress only expressly prohibits state regulation (not local), then
courts should not read the term "local" into the statute. This rule would require
Congress to be more specific about both state and local outcomes and would
abide by the so-called "presumption against preemption," which requires a
plain statement of congressional intent before courts find a subfederal law
preempted. Yet I also explain why courts can continue to apply the current de-
fault rule of state-local merger discussed in Part I when they interpret savings
clauses. Finally, I chart out ways in which federal agencies can serve as partners
in the differentiation project.
These questions matter not only because preemption challenges are so
prevalent. They challenge our fundamental assumptions about the relationships
among the federal, state, and local governments. They also help draw attention
to the independent significance of local governance, strengthening ongoing
scholarly efforts to disentangle the local from the state in federalism theory.
And they enrich ongoing debates about the relative institutional competencies
of Congress, courts, and agencies to wield the federal preemption power-
debates that become particularly heated when that power threatens to nullify
state or local control.
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I. THE STATE-LOCAL CONFLATION AND SIGNS OF DIFFERENTIATION
While the state-local preemption merger has a strong foothold in congres-
sional practice and in judicial doctrine, cracks appear in the facade. This Part
describes the tension between judicial and congressional practices that ignore
state-local differences for purposes of federal preemption and the counterex-
amples where they take differences into account.
A. The Constitutional Source of the State-Local Merger
I start with the Federal Constitution's partial responsibility for the reigning
assumption that federal preemption folds the local into the state. The Constitu-
tion frequently mentions the states but it never discusses towns, cities, or coun-
ties." For example, Article IV, Section 3 protects state boundaries and integri-
ty," while, in contrast, states can create or abolish localities and modify their
boundaries, and local governments often map over each other's territory.2 7 Ar-
ticle IV, Section 4 protects the "Republican Form of Government" for states but
not local governments, and Section 2 gives to individuals various protections
against the states while ignoring local threats. 29 Article I, Section 3 provides only
the states with equal suffrage in the Senate,3o and Article V protects them from
losing that suffrage through constitutional amendments without their consent.3'
25. See supra note 5.
26. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3.
27. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 483 (1968) ("[W]hile spe-
cial-purpose organizations abound and in many States the allocation of functions
among units results in instances of overlap and vacuum, virtually every American
lives within what he and his neighbors regard as a unit of local government ....
In many cases citizens reside within and are subject to two such governments, a
city and a county."); Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?": Normative and
Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1338 (1994);
Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93, 97 (2009)
("Cities, counties and school districts overlap, and divide their responsibilities for
services and powers to tax in complex, sometimes byzantine ways.").
28. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4; see also, e.g., Johnson v. Genesee Cnty., 232 F. Supp. 567,
570 (D. Mich. 1964) ("This guarantee does not extend to systems of local govern-
ment for municipalities, counties, or parishes."); Victoria Verbyla Sutton, Diver-
gent but Co-Existent: Local Governments and Tribal Governments Under the Same
Constitution, 31 URB. LAW. 47, 48 (1999) ("In local government law, citizens are
not entitled to a 'republican form of government."').
29. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
30. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII (providing for direct
election of two senators from each state to the Senate).




Therefore, the story goes, localities have no de jure constitutional presence.?
This silence on local governments shapes federalism theory generally as well as
the subset that focuses on federal preemption.
Yet local governments have more of a constitutional presence than that sto-
ry suggests. They were significant at the time of the Framing and have a consti-
tutional role to play today. One such account looks to the Tenth Amendment's
reservation of powers to "the people." As that provision declares, "[P]owers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."" The "to the
people" clause was not mere surplusage.34 In combination with the "history of
colonial localism" and the "structure of the Constitution" itself, the Tenth
Amendment can be read to preserve the right of local self-determination, seeing
local governments as the best vehicle for the expression of the people's will.
Similarly looking beyond the Constitution's textual silence, others have argued
that local governments have a form of sovereignty apart from the states."6
32. See, e.g., Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments
in an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORD. URB. L.J. 509, 525 (2010) (as-
serting that, under our federalism, sub-state bodies are "inferior and hence unrec-
ognized theoretically and constitutionally"); Jake Sullivan, Comment, The Tenth
Amendment and Local Government, 112 YALE L.J. 1935, 1935 (2003) ("Given this
omission" of local governments, "Supreme Court doctrine and modern scholar-
ship on local government articulate-or at least accept-the following principle:
Localities possess no constitutional personality.").
33. U.S. CowsT. amend. X; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.").
34. Sullivan, supra note 32, at 1937; id. at 1936 n.11 ("[T]hroughout the late nineteenth
century, a significant number of scholars and judges subscribed to the view that
towns and cities retained a right to self-government under the Constitution.")
(citing Amasa M. Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government, 13 HARv. L. REV. 441,
447 (i9oo)); cf Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collabo-
ration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 1021 (2007) (describing the
notion of inherent sovereignty, which sees federal and state powers as "subsets of
the residual sovereignty of the people"); Jonathan Zasloff, The Tyranny of Madi-
son, 44 UCLA L. REV. 795, 856 (1997) (noting that "even local government au-
thority was sparse" as Justice Marshall's jurisprudence was developing).
35. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 32, at 1940 ("Localities were viewed as 'little repub-
lics,' repositories of popular sovereignty through which citizens decided the most
fundamental political questions."); cf Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evalu-
ating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1511 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)) (finding that the "argu-
ment for substantial state and local autonomy was powerful at the time of the
founding, and remains so").
36. See, e.g., Joseph C. Cove, The Relationship Between the Federal Government and
Local Government, in 1 MASSACHUSETTS MUNICIPAL LAW §§ 5.1-5.2 (2008) (argu-
ing that federalism principles "appl[y] equally to local municipal government as
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Constitutional text provides one reason why state-local differences have
remained understudied, but we need not read the Constitution's failure to men-
tion local governments as requiring local merger into the state. More specifical-
ly, such silence does not mean that courts or Congress must treat state and local
governments as equivalents when enacting preemption provisions.
B. Judicial Merger and Recognition of Difference
The next question is whether the judiciary treats state and local laws as
equivalents, either in theory or in practice. This question matters for both liti-
gants and Congress. I find that courts sometimes affirm the conflation story and
at other times find state-local differences relevant to federal preemption out-
comes.
I begin with ways in which the courts have adopted the view of state-local
conflation, eliding the state and the local. The conflation goes well beyond the
common practice of using the terms "state" and "local" interchangeably.17 The
Supreme Court has developed two rules: (1) what I term the "conflation axi-
om," a general rule requiring that state and local laws be analyzed in the same
way in federal preemption cases, and (2) a default rule that when Congress only
protects "states" from preemption in savings clauses, but does not mention lo-
cal governments, we can assume that local governments are also protected.
Both of these doctrines likely arise from a vision of local subordination to
the state, as opposed to a vision of state-local equivalency." Most famously, in
to state government" and that localities "enjoy the prerogatives of sovereignty");
Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 4 (1996) (identifying a form of "'permeable sovereignty' that allows homogene-
ous nomic communities to exercise public as well as private power"); cf Richard
C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L.
& POL. 147, 148 (2005) (reading Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), to mean "that
under some circumstances, localities should be permitted to regulate in areas that
states cannot"); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1, 64 (2004) (exploring whether an autonomy-centered regulatory model
would address the problem "that ... local governments ... have no independent
status under the federal Constitution").
37. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, lo8 (2000) (considering a preemption
challenge to a state law but characterizing the question as "whether the local laws
in question are consistent with the federal statutory structure"); Hillsborough
Cnty. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985) (describing the pre-
sumption against preemption as being about respecting "local concern[s]");
Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 296-97
(1977) (stressing the importance of not preempting those "interests so deeply
rooted in local feeling and responsibility" in a case involving a state law (quoting
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
244 (1959))).
38. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., lic., 536 U.S. 424, 445




Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, the Supreme Court declared that local governments
are "convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
State as may be entrusted to them." 9 Therefore, the "number, nature, and du-
ration of [local governments'] powers" and "territor[ies]" rest in "the absolute
discretion of the State." 4o Hunter serves as a poster child for the most extreme
view of severely diminished local power and inflated state power, ' "haunt[ing]
modern local government law." 42 The so-called judicial "Dillon's Rule" com-
plements Hunter, arising from a late-nineteenth-century treatise.43 According to
this rule, local power arises solely from state delegation, and courts must con-
strue any such delegations to local governments narrowly."4 Many state courts
still apply this rule when considering challenges to the exercise of local authori-
ty.45
This vision is "a quasi-constitutional, instrumental view of the nature of the
state-local relationship."4 ' However, the vision of local powerlessness is lim-
ited;4 7 "no city is as thoroughly under the thumb of the state as a matter of state
lawmaking power of a political subdivision of a State is a subset of the lawmaking
power of the State").
39. 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (rejecting efforts by City of Allegheny residents to resist
consolidation with the City of Pittsburgh, which occurred pursuant to a state
statute).
40. Id.
41. Though Hunter often is cited for the vision of local subordination to state power,
it was not the first case to demonstrate this vision. See, e.g., City of Worcester v.
Worcester Consol. St. Ry. Co., 196 U.S. 539, 549-51 (1905) (citing nine-
teenth-century cases).
42. Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scru-
tiny, 86 DENv. U. L. REV. 1337, 1337 (2009).
43. See 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
44. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2285
(2003) (describing the rule); Gary T. Schwartz, Reviewing and Revising Dillon's
Rule, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1991) (same).
45. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Govern-
ment Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 n.14 (1990) (citing scholars making this observa-
tion).
46. Davidson, supra note 34, at loo.
47. Cf Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law To Free State
and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1208
(1999) (arguing that confidence in Dillon's Rule is "hardly obvious"-i.e., that lo-
cal governments are not necessarily powerless in the absence of state authoriza-
tion).
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law"4' as this vision would suggest. The Court later counseled against broad ad-
herence to Hunter's "seemingly unconfined dicta;" "a correct reading" of
Hunter and related cases "is not that the State has plenary power to manipulate
in every conceivable way, for every conceivable purpose, the affairs of its mu-
nicipal corporations." 49 Indeed, the Court declared that it "has never acknowl-
edged that the States have power to do as they will with municipal corporations
regardless of consequences."so Additionally, the home-rule movement that took
shape at the end of the nineteenth century partly sought to counter Dillon's
Rule and similar constrictions on local authority.? Home-rule provisions in
state constitutions and statutes therefore removed many assumed limitations on
local power, even occasionally offering immunity against state interference in
certain arenas." Home-rule provisions therefore have been called "mini-Tenth
Amendments designed to cordon off local matters from state intervention.""
1. The Conflation Axiom
In its 1985 Hillsborough County opinion, the Supreme Court declared that,
"for purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local ordinances
48. David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the Constitu-
tion, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2243 (20o6); see also Davidson, supra note 34, at 1022
("[The] view of local powerlessness and the unitary state is simply one path taken,
and by no means an entirely solid one."); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Con-
cept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1061-62 (1980) (challenging the view of cities as pure
receptacles for state delegation under state control and criticizing limitations on
local power).
49. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344 (196o); id. at 346-47 (discussing Fifteenth
Amendment constraints); see also, e.g., Barron, supra note 22, at 3 ("The state su-
premacist rhetoric in Hunter is excessive, and subsequent precedent suggests that
the Court no longer subscribes to all of it.").
So. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 344; see also Sullivan, supra note 32, at 1937-39; cf Fort Gra-
tiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992)
("[A] State ... may not avoid the strictures of the Commerce Clause by curtailing
the movement of articles of commerce through subdivisions of the State . . . ").
51. See, e.g., Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible Cities: Three Local Government Models and
Immigration Regulation, io OR. REV. INT L L. 453, 466 (2008).
52. See, e.g., Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 42, at 1341; David J. Barron & Gerald E.
Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261, 263
(2005); Briffault, supra note 45, at 17-18.
53. Barron, supra note 5, at 392; cf Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 42, at 1337 ("How
constitutional home rule can be reconciled with the Hunter principle is an endur-
ing puzzle in American local government law."). I return to the significance of




is analyzed in the same way as that of statewide laws."54 In other words, the
Court established a blanket rule that courts should not take state-local differ-
ences into account in federal preemption cases."
I call this rule the conflation axiom. Though no one has identified, let alone
analyzed, this rule, the axiom is becoming firmly established, with dozens of
opinions" as well as legal scholarship 7 and treatises'" citing it. The rule seems to
extend to the "presumption against preemption" as well, requiring that a pre-
sumption of lawfulness apply to both state and local law in the absence of clear
congressional intent to the contrary.59 This black-letter presumption states that
courts should not find state and local law preempted unless Congress has
demonstrated a "clear and manifest purpose" to preempt it."o
The conflation axiom guides judicial decision making; it does not mandate
that Congress treat state and local laws as equivalents. But the rule likely con-
54. Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (unan-
imous opinion).
55. The Hillsborough County briefs had not recommended that the Court adopt the
axiom or make such a rule explicit, and Justice Marshall's papers are silent on the
issue. See E-mail from Patrick Kerwin, Manuscript Reference Librarian, Library of
Congress, to Beth Gordon, Reference Librarian, Cardozo Law Sch. (Aug. 10, 2010,
12:56 PM EST) (on file with author). The Court had ruled on federal preemption
challenges to local laws earlier, see, e.g., R.R. Transfer Serv., Inc. v. City of Chica-
go, 386 U.S. 351 (1967), but did not formulate the axiom as a rule. The first such
formulation I found was in a 1982 dissent. See Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 69 (1982) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("This Court has
made no .. . distinction between States and their subdivisions with regard to the
pre-emptive effects of federal law.").
56. See, e.g., Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, 507
U.S. 218, 224 (1993); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991);
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 614 n-5 (1986);
Liberty Cablevision of P.R., Inc. v. Municipality of Caguas, 417 F.3d 216, 220-21 (Ist
Cir. 2005); Miller v. Miller, 788 A.2d 717, 721 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
57. See, e.g., Young, supra note 36, at 65; Paul S. Weiland, Comment, Federal and State
Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
237, 253 (2000).
58. See, e.g., 16 Am. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 56 & n.9; 62 C.J.S. MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS § 194 & nn-14-15 (2010).
59. See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 269
(2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (drawing attention to the fact that the presumption
against preemption applies equally to localities as to states).
60. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted); see al-
so, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555> 565 (2009) (same); cf Erwin Chemerinsky,
Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1324-28 (2004) (showing flaws in the Court's application of
the presumption and the harms to valuable state laws); Young, supra note 21, at
262 (discussing the weaknesses of the presumption against preemption).
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tributes to the general inattention to state-local differences in the federal
preemption universe.
2. The Default Rule that "State" Means "State and Local" in Savings
Clauses
The Court has developed another formal default rule for preemption cases:
Courts should presume that the term "state" in savings clauses includes "local"
regulation, or at least the state's ability to delegate authority to the local level.
Preemption provisions generally take two forms: preemption clauses and, the
focus here, savings clauses. Preemption clauses do the work of staking out ex-
clusive federal territory. They state Congress's intent to displace state or local
regulation and may or may not actually use the term "preempt." Conversely,
savings clauses carve out safe harbors for specified kinds of state or local regula-
tion. Though often drafted in boilerplate language," savings clauses fulfill a
range of anti-preemption goals."
The Supreme Court established this rule relatively recently (in 1991) when
interpreting a savings clause in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA). FIFRA declares that "[a] State may regulate the sale or use of
any federally registered pesticide. . . in the State" as long as it does not "permit
any sale or use prohibited by this subchapter."6 3 A Wisconsin town called Casey,
with a population of about 500, had enacted an ordinance requiring pesticide
users to obtain permits from the town board for certain pesticide applications.
The plaintiffs challenged Casey's ordinance as preempted by FIFRA (as well as
by state law), arguing that the term "state" in the savings clause did not preserve
local regulation. The town countered that Congress wanted to protect local reg-
ulation as well: "[O]nly the localities where the pesticide will be used can be
aware of the local conditions and the hazards that pesticide use can cause in a
particular locality."64 Contributing to a lower court split on the question, the
6. See Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism
Theory, and Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 2, at 166, 176 (ar-
guing that savings clauses cannot "capture the enormous and pervasive work of
federal law in environmental regulation"); cf Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544
U.S. 431, 446 n.21 (2005) (noting that "[n]ot even the most dedicated hair-splitter
could distinguish" some preemption clauses from each other (quoting Shaw v.
Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 371 (7 th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Sandi Zellmer, When Congress Goes Unheard: Savings Clauses' Rocky
Judicial Reception, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 3, at 144, 165 (proposing
model savings clause language for Congress).
62. Zellmer, supra note 61, at 146, 164.
63. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2006).




Wisconsin Supreme Court held that local governments such as Casey could not
rely on the savings provision.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Morti-
er.66 The Court first set forth the conflation axiom;6' then it created a default
rule, concluding that FIFRA's savings clause preserved local regulation as well as
state regulation:
Properly read, the statutory language tilts in favor of local regulation.
The principle is well settled that local governmental units are created as
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of
the State as may be entrusted to them in [its] absolute discretion. The
exclusion of political subdivisions cannot be inferred from the express
authorization to the "State[s]" because political subdivisions are com-
ponents of the very entity the statute empowers.
A decade later, in 2002, the Court addressed a similar statutory interpreta-
tion question in City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service9: whether
the savings clause in the Interstate Commerce Act that mentioned only state
regulation nevertheless included local law. Resolving a circuit split,70 the Court
focused on the question of state delegation of authority to local governments.
The Court declared that, as a default rule, a "reference to the 'regulatory au-
thority of a State' should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional pre-
rogative of the States to delegate their authority to their constituent parts."7 '
65. Compare, e.g., id. (holding that the term "state" does not include local govern-
ments, meaning that local regulation was preempted), with People ex rel.
Deukmejian v. Cnty. of Mendocino, 36 Cal. 3d 476 (1984) (finding no preemption
of local regulation).
66. 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
67. Id. at 605 ("It is, finally, axiomatic that 'for the purposes of the Supremacy Clause,
the constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the same way as that of
statewide laws."' (quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 713 (1985))); see also discussion supra Section I.B.
68. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 607-08 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see
also id. at 610-12.
69. 536 U.S. 424 (2002).
70. See id. at 431-32 (2002) ("The Courts of Appeals have divided on the question
whether § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s safety regulation exception to preemption encom-
passes municipal regulations."); see also Auto. Club of N.Y., Inc. v. Dykstra, 520
F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that a New York City regulation was not pre-
served by the savings clause, but not because it was a local regulation).
71. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 429. But see id. at 448 (Scalia, I., dissenting) (noting that
the state's power is not "sacrosanct"); id. at 443 (arguing that "a reference to
'State' power or authority can be meant to include" local powers or just state
power); see also, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 596 F.3d 602,
606 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that regulations by the Port of Los Angeles fell within
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Again, the rule is only a default: In both Mortier and Ours Garage, the
Court considered legislative history and employed various canons of construc-
tion to conclude that the term "state" in the relevant statutory provisions in-
cluded the local or at least the power of the state to delegate to the local. Ac-
cordingly, while courts have applied the rule to savings clauses in other statutes
to read "local" into the term "state,"" others have refused to do so, noting that
it is not a hard rule.7 3
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether to apply this default
rule to a preemption clause-i.e., a clause prohibiting state regulation-as op-
posed to a savings clause. The Second Circuit did find that the term "state" in-
cludes the local in what it believed to be the Occupational Safety and Health
Act's (OSH Act) preemption clause. 74 A circuit split developed because other
courts, such as the Sixth Circuit, disagreed.75 In Part IV, I argue that courts
should limit the Mortier-Ours Garage statutory interpretation default rule of
merger to savings clauses and not extend it to preemption clauses.
the safety exception); Tillison v. City of San Diego, 4o6 F-3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir.
2005) (applying the safety exception and discussing Ours Garage).
72. See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 941-43 (9 th Cir. 2002)
(interpreting savings clauses that only mentioned the "state," 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9614(a), 9652(d)).
73. See, e.g., United States v. City & Cnty. of Denver, ioo F-3d 1509, 1513 (loth Cir.
1996) (refusing to extend Mortier's reasoning to the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(d)(2)(A)(ii): "If Congress had wished to include local zoning ordinances
within the definition of 'state law' it would surely have so stated."); cf id. (citing
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)'s reference to "State or po-
litical subdivision" as an example of Congress including local zoning ordinances
within the definition of "state law").
74. See Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1988).
75. Compare id. (merging the local into the state), with Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of
Akron, 801 F.2d 824, 829 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[Tjhe trial court concluded that Con-
gress did not simply overlook including political subdivisions or that it implicitly
included them in the word 'state.' We concur in the trial court's conclusion."); cf
R. Mayer of Atlanta, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 158 F.3d 538, 547 (1th Cir. 1998)
("Mortier ... falls short of establishing a rule that the word 'state' must be inter-
preted to include political subdivisions in all circumstances."); Prof'1 Lawn Care
Ass'n v. Village of Milford, 909 F.2d 929, 941 (6th Cir. 1990) (Nelson, J., concur-
ring) (noting, in a Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)
opinion vacated post-Mortier, the "radically different usages" of the term "State,"
even in the Constitution). However, the Supreme Court made the split less rele-
vant when it subsequently held in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management
Ass'n that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) does not have an
express preemption clause-in other words, what seemed to be a preemption




3. Signs of Judicial Differentiation
The Court's adoption of the conflation axiom and of the default rule that
state means state and local (at least in savings clauses) does not mean that
courts never differentiate between the two in federal preemption cases.
First, courts treat state and local regulations differently when adjudicating
certain otherwise identical constitutional challenges. Formal judicial doctrines
bar local governments from benefitting from state immunity under the Elev-
enth Amendment?" when they face preemption challenges under federal anti-
trust laws"' as well as under § 1983 challenges.7' And, less formally, a study of
federal preemption decisions found that a set of Democratic judges preempted
local laws more often than they preempted state laws when considering
preemption by federal environmental and health and safety statutes.79 Legal
scholars also have found that courts do or should treat state and local laws dif-
ferently in other constitutional contexts, such as freedom of religion and free-
dom of speech cases.so
76. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 369 (2001) ("[TIhe Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity
to units of local government.").
77. See Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1982) (not includ-
ing cities in exemptions from antitrust laws that were granted to states); City of
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(same).
78. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (holding that-
unlike states-municipalities are not immune from § 1983 liability).
79. See David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1178-79 &
tbl.9, 1186-87 (1999). It is no surprise that political party affects preemption case
outcomes. A slew of recent descriptive and empirical studies has shown that judg-
es' ideological predispositions and other factors extraneous to the merits affect
preemption outcomes. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure
of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEo. L.J. 1, 20 & n.87
(2009) (citing studies); Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 695, 705 (2001) (discussing the influence of "[t]he cultural attitudes judges
bring" to democracy cases); Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extratex-
tual Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 63, 64-65 (2010) (surveying studies).
80. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 34, at 975 n.56, 982 & n-78, 983 & n.82, 990; Mark D.
Rosen, Institutional Context in Constitutional Law: A Critical Examination of Term
Limits, Judicial Campaign Codes, and Anti-Pornography Ordinances, 21 J.L. & POL.
223 (2005); Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitu-
tional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of
the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1810
(2004); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 822 (2006) [hereinafter
Winkler, Fatal in Theory] ("Strict scrutiny is much more fatal to local laws (17%
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Finally, as described below,"' the Court in 2004 treated state law differently
from local law when adjudicating a local challenge to state law based on a feder-
al preemption provision. While the Court has not outright banned federal
preemption challenges by local governments against their parent states, the im-
position of a superclear-statement rule for Congress in such cases indicates that
the conflation axiom-the rule of equal treatment of state and local laws-is, at
the very least, incomplete.
C. Current Congressional Practice
Against that constitutional and judicial background, this Section turns to
actual congressional practice. To see how Congress treats the state and the local,
I studied the preemption provisions in thirteen leading environmental, health,
and safety statutes."2 I selected these statutes in part because of the study finding
that (Democratic) judges preempted local laws more often than state laws in
cases involving these statutes." I began by asking whether statutory text helps
explain their finding and emerged with broader observations about congres-
sional practice.
These statutes constitute a fraction of the nearly seven hundred preemptive
statutes in effect.84 Therefore, future research might find that preemption provi-
sions in other statutory realms, such as education, exhibit different patterns.
Future research also might discover, for example, that Congress's preemp-
survival rate) than it is to state laws (29% survival rate) . . . ."); Adam Winkler,
Free Speech Federalism, 1o8 MICH. L. REV. 153, 155 (2009) [hereinafter Winkler,
Free Speech Federalism] ("[T]he level of government is a very good predictor of
whether a speech restriction is likely to be upheld by the federal courts . . . ."). But
see David A. King, Note, Formalizing Local Constitutional Standards of Review and
the Implications for Federalism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1685, 1711 & n.135-36 (2on) (de-
scribing reasons for greater deference to local laws in certain constitutional con-
texts).
81. See Section II.A.
82. See apps. A-B. Because each of the thirteen statutes that I examine is highly com-
plex, this analysis does not capture the considerations involved in the drafting of
each statute's preemption provisions. Also, because of the length and complexity
of the statutes, it is possible that not all provisions with preemptive effect are ana-
lyzed here.
83. See Spence & Murray, supra note 79.
84. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text; cf Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Signif-
icance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, lo6 MICH. L. REV. 567, 573 (2008)
(noting that, in matters of federalism, one must be "responsive to facts on the
ground, or to the arrangements that the various levels of government have devised
to manage the challenges that cross their jurisdictions"). See generally Sandra
Zeilmer, Preemption by Stealth, 45 Hous. L. REV. 1659, 1674-84, 1699-1702 (2009)





tion-provision drafting habits have changed over time or that the house in
which a preemption provision originates matters.5 Caution in not extrapolat-
ing too much from these findings also is advisable given the flaws in the enact-
ment process: In addition to standard drafting problems (infelicitously tangled
phrases, for example), preemption provisions can reflect congressional over-
sights or deadlock on what kind of preemption to cover, producing intentional-
ly vague terms.
I focus on state-local differentiation in express statutory preemption provi-
sions for two reasons. First, Congress can do the work of state-local differentia-
tion most efficiently through these provisions. Second, these provisions provide
the best indication of congressional intent, and intent is the "touchstone" of the
preemption analysis8 7 In the absence of such express preemption provisions,
courts will search for implied congressional intent, employing the so-called field
and conflict preemption doctrines."
i. Mapping Preemption Provisions
I found that Congress sometimes mentions both state and local regulatory
authority and sometimes only state authority in its preemption and savings
clauses. Congress also sometimes crafts hybrid preemption or savings clauses
that link the preservation or rejection of state authority to truly local condi-
tions. At the very least, these variations start to chip away at the assumption of
state-local merger.
I begin with preemption clauses-the provisions crafted to trump subfed-
eral regulation to achieve federal predominance over some regulatory matter.
85. Perhaps, for example, preemption provisions that explicitly address local authori-
ty tend to originate in the House of Representatives, with the hypothesis being
that the House is more accessible, majoritarian, and sensitized to local concerns.
See, e.g., David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 Nw. U.
L. REV. 507, 519 (2008) (discussing the majoritarian nature of the House as com-
pared with the Senate).
86. See, e.g., Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 22, at 21 (describing some of these sit-
uations).
87. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("[O]ur analysis of the scope of
the statute's pre-emption is guided by our oft-repeated comment... that '[tihe
purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case."'
(quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963))). This intent max-
im has been called a "bromide endlessly repeated or paraphrased" in subsequent
decisions. Merrill, supra note n1, at 740; see also, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Inter-
pretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863, 875 (1930) (pointing out the many limitations on
such a search for intent).
88. See Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2oo8). The categories sometimes
overlap in practice. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
104 n.2 (1992).
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Congress addresses both state and local regulation in the majority of the
preemption clauses that I examined: nineteen of the twenty-five provisions.9
For example, a Clean Water Act clause states that if a qualifying federal stand-
ard is in effect, a "State or political subdivision or interstate agency may not
adopt or enforce any effluent limitation . . . [or other related standard] which is
less stringent" than the federal one.90 In contrast, six preemption clauses ex-
pressly preempt only state regulation; they are silent on the question of local
law.9' For example, a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) preemption clause precludes recovery of "removal
costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal law" if the
same recovery was available under the statute.92 Finally, three statutes lacked
express preemption clauses.93
The patterns shift when we turn to savings clauses. Eighteen out of the for-
ty-two savings clauses in the thirteen statutes examined here-less than half-
mention both state and local regulation.94 For example, the Toxic Substances
Control Act's general savings provision declares that "nothing in this chapter
shall affect the authority of any State or political subdivision of a State to estab-
lish or continue in effect regulation of any chemical substance, mixture, or arti-
cle containing a chemical substance or mixture."95 Twenty-four savings claus-
es-more than half-only mention state regulation, meaning that Congress is
silent on what outcome it desires for local regulation. 96 For example, the OSH
89. See app. A.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(1)(B) (20o6) (emphasis added).
91. See app. A.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(b) (emphasis added).
93. See app. A; see also, e.g., Gade, 505 U.S. at 104 n.2 (1992) (concluding that the ar-
rangement under the OSH Act did not rise to the level of express preemption);
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regulating Dist., 673
F-3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) ("The [Federal Power Acti does not contain an express
preemption clause."); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147
(8th Cir. 1971) ("[N]o provision of the Atomic Energy Act expressly declares that
the federal government shall have the sole and exclusive authority to regulate ra-
diation emissions from nuclear power plants."). But see Gade, 505 U.S. at 109-14
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the provision does constitute express
preemption).
94. See app. B.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (emphasis added). For another example, see SED, Inc. v.
City of Dayton. 519 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (relying on another Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act savings provision that mentions both state and local regula-
tion to find a local regulation saved).
96. See app. B; cf Ophir v. City of Boston, 647 F. Supp. 2d 86, 92 n.15 (D. Mass. 2009)
(discussing Clean Air Act (CAA) savings clauses that only mention the "state"





Act declares Congress's intent not to "prevent any State agency or court from
asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health is-
sue with respect to which no standard is in effect."97 The remaining four savings
clauses do not mention either state or local regulation explicitly.9'
2. What the Mapping Reveals
Despite the assumption of state-local equivalence, Congress employs sever-
al strategies to differentiate between the two. First, Congress mandates equal
outcomes for state and local laws in most cases. In about three-fourths of the
preemption clauses and in almost half of the savings clauses, Congress specifies
that a preemption choice applies to both state and local law. From one perspec-
tive, lumping state and local law together for equal treatment can be seen as a
form of conflation. But from another perspective, mentioning both state and
local law constitutes a form of differentiation. That is, mentioning both
acknowledges that both state and local regulatory authority exist. Pure confla-
tion, in contrast, occurs when Congress uses the term "state" and assumes that
local governments fall into that category as well.
In contrast, many preemption provisions mention outcomes only for state
regulation, remaining silent on local regulation. In six preemption clauses and
twenty-four savings clauses, Congress only specifies outcomes for the "state." It
seems fair to conclude that Congress sometimes engages in conflation when it
only mentions the "state" because it assumes that the term "state" includes the
local, while it sometimes engages in differentiation when it only mentions the
"state" because it truly means only state, not "state and local."
Congress likely is engaging in differentiation, rather than conflation, in a
few situations. First, Congress likely means "state" and not "state and local"
when only states can or do regulate the subject matter that Congress is target-
ing. For example, Congress provided that, for personal injury or property dam-
ages actions arising from hazardous substances, CERCLA preempts the state
statute of limitations if certain conditions are met." If no local law provides a
relevant statute of limitations, the failure to mention local law is understandable
and even deliberate. Similarly, Congress preempts state authority over car regis-
tration matters in the Clean Air Act (CAA) but does not mention local law,o
97. 29 U.S.C. § 667.
98. See app. B.
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1); Evans v. Walter Indus., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (N.D.
Ala. 2008) (addressing preemption of an Alabama statute of limitations provi-
sion).
oo. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) ("No State shall require [approval] ... as condition prece-
dent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle,
motor vehicle engine, or equipment."). But see id. § 7543(d) (mentioning both the
state and the local in a savings provision, but covering more types of regulation
than just registration).
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likely because states, not localities, typically regulate car registration matters.
And the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) preserves only the
state's authority to request a manifest for hazardous waste generated in or com-
ing into that state, which again seems to be a state, not local, function.o' We al-
so might assume that Congress means only "state" when it enacts savings claus-
es that preserve state tort and common law nuisance claimslO2 because there are
no local equivalents. Finally, though less certainly, we can apply standard can-
ons of construction to assume that Congress intends "state" to mean only
"state" when, in a single provision, it first specifies outcomes for both state and
local law and then specifies outcomes only for state law, as it did in one CAA
provision"o3 and one RCRA provision.'0 4 While such silence on local outcomes
can be rational (if not advisable), it can fail to give notice to local governments
about their expected roles. As Section I.B showed, litigation can result over
whether the term "state" includes "local."
A separate phenomenon is visible in some of these state-only clauses: The
state outcome depends on local conditions or local contributions. I call these
the "local-twist" provisions. For example, a Hazardous Materials Transporta-
tion Act (HMTA) provision constrains state authority in part by requiring
states to ensure that localities follow the Secretary of Transportation's standards
and requiring states to resolve conflicts among political subdivisions .1 5 Another
HMTA provision requires states and tribes to consult with local authorities
when making certain highway routing decision.1o6 Linking state outcomes to
oi. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929.
102. Buzbee, Federal Floors, supra note 3, at 101-02 (noting that industry prefers ceil-
ings); Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 22, at 30.
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a); see also, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality
Mgt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) (applying the first sentence of § 7543(a) to indicate
state-level preemption).
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (20o6 & Supp. 2010); cf, e.g., ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d
743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that "concurrent regulation is not totally preclud-
ed"); N. Haven Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Upjohn Co., 753 F. Supp. 423, 429
(D. Conn. 1990) (describing RCRA's savings clause as a way "to promulgate ...
cooperation"), affd, 921 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1990); Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San
Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1444 (S.D. Cal. 1988) ("Congress, by way of the 'savings'
clause, clearly did envision the extra layer of regulatory requirements that might
be imposed by local governments.").
105. See 49 U.S.C. § 5112(b)(1)(H) (20o6) (stating that the Secretary's standards for
states and tribes must contain "a requirement that a State be responsible (i) for
ensuring that political subdivisions of the State comply with standards prescribed
under this subsection ... ; and (ii) for resolving a dispute between political subdi-
visions").
106. Id. § 5112(b)(1)(C) (stating that the Secretary's standards for states and tribes must
contain "a requirement that, in establishing a highway routing designation, limi-
tation, or requirement, a State or Indian tribe consult with appropriate State, lo-




local consultation reflects a vision of localities as specially qualified and knowl-
edgeable. Similarly, a Federal Power Act provision preserves the "laws of the re-
spective States" regarding water when that water is being used for "municipal
purposes," among other uses.10 7 And the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA)
savings clause permits states to go above a federal floor if, among other re-
quirements, doing so is necessary "to eliminate or reduce an essentially local
safety or security hazard.""as Courts have interpreted FRSA's "essentially local
hazard" clause to mean that the problem addressed cannot be statewide.o 9
However, agencies and courts have concluded that two other local-twist clauses
do not actually require that local (versus statewide) conditions determine the
outcome. t o
for localities outside their jurisdiction, weakening the requirement for our pur-
poses. Cf 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (protecting, as part of the CWA, state rights to allo-
cate water quantities, and gesturing at federal cooperation with "local agencies");
City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 n.9 (ioth Cir. 1996) (applying the
provision to tribes); Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 5o8, 513 (ioth
Cir. 1985) (discussing a Clean Water Act clause in relation to local irrigation dis-
tricts without comment on the decision to extend it beyond a state body); Alame-
da Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 930 F. Supp. 486, 493 (D. Colo. 1996) (same).
107. See 16 U.S.C. § 821; see also Mega Renewables v. Cnty. of Shasta, 644 F. Supp. 491,
497 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (rejecting the preemption challenge to a state law and discuss-
ing state law in a particularly favorable light).
1o8. See 49 U.S.C. § 201o6(a)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010).
109. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675 (1993) (citing the local
hazard rule); Jacob Z. Jacobson v. BNSF Ry. Co., No. 1:11-CV-oloo3, 2011 WL
6099389, at *6 (D.S.D. Dec. 7, 2011) (citing, inter alia, H.R. REP. No. 91-1194, at 12
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4104, 4117).
no. One clause appears in FIFRA. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(c)(1) (2oo6) (letting states regis-
ter pesticides for uses beyond those registered by the federal government "to meet
special local needs"); 40 C.F.R. § 162.151 (2012) (defining "special local need"); 3
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., RODGERS' ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 5:15 (2011) (noting
that this savings clause applies to statewide, not just local, situations); cf Mary
Jane Angelo, The Killing Fields: Reducing the Casualties in the Battle Between U.S.
Species Protection Law and U.S. Pesticide Law, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 95, 145
n.281 (2008) (interpreting "special local needs," apparently to mean truly "local").
The other provision appears in the OSH Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2) (speci-
fying that a state occupational health and safety plan can be approved to replace a
federal standard if, among other requirements, the standards "are required by
compelling local conditions"); Shell Oil Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 106 F. Supp.
2d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2000) (interpreting this provision "to allow increased state regu-
lation whenever the state regulators identify compelling conditions within their
own borders"); Supplement to California State Plan; Approval, 62 Fed. Reg. 31,159
(June 6, 1997) (stating that state standards affecting interstate commerce "must be
required by compelling local conditions"). However, there is not much case law
interpreting this provision. Cf Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Killian, 918 F.2d
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These local-twist clauses are important here first because they show Con-
gress linking a favorable preemption judgment to the local. State-level law es-
capes federal preemption by riding on the back of the local, reversing the stand-
ard story of states empowering local governments.m' Second, these clauses show
Congress taking into account state-local differences, finding such differences
meaningful for purposes of preemption.
Congress, therefore, acknowledges state and local differences far more often
than the conflation story recognizes. However, while Congress has a set of tools
for differentiation, I see little evidence in statutory text or legislative history that
Congress has any real system for thinking about state-local differences. Part III
proposes such a framework to encourage statutory drafting that takes the fullest
advantage of state and local capacities.
We emerge from Part I's investigations having identified and then having
started to untangle the strong assumption of state-local equivalency that pre-
vails in federal preemption scholarship and doctrine. Instead of an undifferenti-
ated mass, state and local laws at times appear as separate threads in the bundle
of subfederal regulations potentially subject to federal preemption. I now turn
to more normative and prescriptive considerations.
II. DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER To DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN STATE
AND LOCAL REGULATION?
This Part addresses a threshold challenge: Can Congress specify divergent
outcomes for state and local regulation in preemption clauses, particularly if
Congress is seeking to constrain state authority while upholding local authority?
For example, what if Congress preempts state authority but preserves local law
because it concluded that a given regulatory matter is best handled at the local
level, whether for efficiency or other reasons?"' Or what if Congress seeks to
preserve local regulation over a given matter and therefore explicitly preempts
671, 678 (7th Cir. 1990) (leaving out this provision from a discussion of OSH Act
preemption).
in. Courts seem to engage in a similar move when they cite specifically local condi-
tions while addressing federal preemption challenges to state authority. See Gor-
don, supra note 23, at 2o8-09 & nn.99-loi (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 578 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting); Nat'l League of Cit-
ies v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976); Briffault, supra note 27, at 1328-35).
112. See Se. Oakland Cnty. Res. Recovery Auth. v. City of Madison Heights, 5 F.3d 166,
169 (6th Cir. 1993) ("If the state has preempted [the local ordinance], its validity
cannot be saved by a grant of authority from Congress." (quoting R.I. Cogenera-





any attempt by the states to preclude localities from acting?"3 I argue that Con-
gress has the power to do both.
A. The Gregory Plain Statement Rule for Congressional Interference with
State Authority
Congress cannot recklessly interfere with states' internal structures. Yet
such intervention is permissible if Congress follows the rules.
Most important here, Congress can interfere with state authority if it makes
its intention to do so crystal clear. As the Court declared in Gregory v. Ashcroft,
"[I]f Congress intends to alter the usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government, it must make its intention to do so unmis-
takably clear in the language of the statute."114 The Court called this a
"plain-statement rule" that recognizes "that the States retain substantial sover-
eign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress
does not readily interfere.""' While often cited as a constraint on federal power,
the plain-statement rule also recognizes the liberating power of the Supremacy
Clause, which provides that, notwithstanding "any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary," federal law prevails over conflicting state
law."' As the Court therefore conceded in Gregory, state sovereignty is "sub-
ject ... to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause."" 7
In its 2004 Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League decision, the Court relied on
Congress's failure to use crystal-clear language, as required by the
plain-statement rule, as an alternative ground for holding that a local govern-
113. See also Hills, supra note 47, at 1211 ("At most, such federal laws simply require the
state to remove certain restrictions on the power of subordinate officials so that
those officials can voluntarily assume federal duties.").
114. 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
115. Id. at 461.
n6. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
117. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); cf Brad-
ford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in Buzbee, PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra
note 3, at 208, 210 (finding the Gregory rule to be too strong). These powers might
be particularly strong when Congress is acting pursuant to its Commerce Clause
authority. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations and among the several states"); see also, e.g.,
Benjamin H. Barton, An Article I Theory of the Inherent Powers of the Federal
Courts, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2011) ("As long as congressional action passes
the low 'necessary and proper' bar, Congress has plenary Article I authority to
pass the laws it pleases."). They might be weaker when Congress is acting pursu-
ant to its bankruptcy power. See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improve-
ment Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (holding that Congress cannot employ its
bankruptcy power to force local governments into involuntary bankruptcy with-
out their respective states' permission).
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ment could not rely on federal preemption doctrine to preempt a state law that
prohibited local authority over telecommunications."' The Court first conclud-
ed that Congress could not have intended to permit local regulation against the
will of the states in this case, offering "a few hypotheticals" from state and local
government law to "bring the point home."" But the Court then turned to "a
complementary principle"-namely, the Gregory plain-statement rule.'2 0 The
Court concluded that Gregory "would bring us to the same conclusion even on
the assumption that preemption could operate straightforwardly to provide lo-
cal choice, as in some instances it might."' Thus the Court acknowledges that,
in some circumstances, federal preemption might operate to trump state law
and to "provide local choice"-but Congress failed to clearly state its intent in
the Federal Telecommunications Act to permit such an outcome.
"To take the Court's anxiety [in Missouri Municipal League] head on, then,"
as Nestor Davidson observes, "the question becomes whether it is possible to
defend the delegation of federal authority to local governments even in the face
of direct state resistance."' The answer, I believe, is yes. Different facts in fu-
ture cases could mean that, when the Court spins out its hypotheticals, it will
not find the same kind of chaos that results from permitting a local government
to wield federal preemption against its parent state. And, most relevant here,
Congress can make clearer its intention to permit the preemption of state law in
order to protect local choice. 3 Congress has the power to intervene in
118. 541 U.S. 125 (2004) (considering a preemption claim relying on the Federal Tele-
communications Act). In Missouri Municipal League, a Missouri statute prohibit-
ed the state's political subdivisions from offering certain telephone services. Id.
The Federal Telecommunications Act stated that no one could "prohibit ... any
entity" from entering the telecommunications market, a phrase interpreted along-
side another express preemption provision. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), (d) (1996) (empha-
sis added). The statutory interpretation question therefore was whether the phrase
"any entity" included localities such that federal law preempted Missouri's statute
constraining local action.
11g. Missouri Municipal League, 541 U.S. at 134. While the Court's willingness to engage
in such hypotheticals is suspect, that point is not directly relevant to the discus-
sion here.
120. Id. at 140.
121. Id.; see also id. (stating that the "liberating preemption" the localities sought
"would come only by interposing federal authority between a State and its munic-
ipal subdivisions, which our precedents teach, 'are created as convenient agen-
cies' of the state (quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08
(1991))).
122. Davidson, supra note 34, at 1018.
123. See also Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877,
953 (20n) (reading Missouri Municipal League in the same way). Others have ar-
gued that the FCC has this power in the context of local provision of broadband.
See, e.g., Matthew Dunne, Note, Let My People Go (Online): The Power of the FCC




state-local relations, including by differentiating between the state and local in
the text of preemption provisions.
B. Other Support for Congressional Authority To Differentiate
Additional justifications derived from both case law and political theory
support the conclusion that Congress has the power to differentiate between
state and local governments in preemption provisions.
Although it struck down the attempt in Missouri Municipal League, the
Court in other cases has permitted local governments to bring federal preemp-
tion claims against state governments.12 4 In Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood
School District No. 40-1, the Court permitted a county to rely on a federal statute
in order to preempt a state law that purported to limit how the county could
use federal funds."' The Court rejected the "concerns of federalism" that the
state raised."' And in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department
of Ecology, the Court addressed an attempt by a city and a local utility district to
use the Federal Power Act to trump a state environmental agency's decision."'
The Court proceeded to the merits of the preemption claim without rejecting
the claim as a threshold matter-that is, without holding that local entities
lacked the power to wield federal law in this manner. The Court ultimately re-
jected the claim on the merits.
Turning to political theory, one also can argue that Congress is the most in-
stitutionally competent actor to make decisions about distributing power
1126 (2007) (making a sweeping argument for federal power to preempt adverse
state laws in the broadband context).
124. Hills, supra note 47, at 1207-08 (discussing the Washington Supreme Court's con-
clusion that Congress could not "endow a state-created municipality with powers
greater than those given it by its creator, the state legislature" (quoting City of Ta-
coma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 307 P.2d 567, 577 (Wash. 1957))); see also Gillian E.
Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 593 (2011) (citing
Missouri Municipal League for the proposition that "[a] lthough the Court has re-
cently signaled that such federal authorization of local violations of state law may
raise federalism concerns," it previously has "sustained federal power to preempt
state-law limits on actions by localities"); Rodriguez, supra note 84, at 637 (specu-
lating that federal intervention in state-local relations "might be appropriate in
some circumstances").
125. 469 U.S. 256, 270 (1985). Lead-Deadwood was issued in the same year as Hills-
borough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985),
which was the first explicit recognition of the conflation axiom. In both cases, the
level of government was deemed irrelevant to resolving the federal preemption
challenge.
126. Lead-Deadwood, 469 U.S. at 269.
127. 511 U.S. 700, 721-22 (1994).
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among the three levels of government.128 Federal legislation gains a unique form
of legitimacy through the processes of deliberation, representation, and dia-
logue with the public that judicial decisions cannot replicate.12 9 As a practical
matter, courts cannot engage in the kind of extensive fact-gathering and policy
fine-tuning that is Congress's specialty.' Congressional staff, agencies, and
state and local lobbying organizations assist in the process."' These institutional
strengths complement a process-based view of preemption grounded in consti-
tutional text and structure.'
Of course, congressional decision making has its flaws.133 Congress rarely
acts with a single unified voice. Members frequently vote on legislation despite
being unfamiliar with the details. And factors extraneous to the merits of the
legislation shape the resulting statutes-including "raw political power,"3 4 tac-
tical reasons to combine provisions (i.e., "logrolling" '3 ), and other
128. See Davidson, supra note 34, at 961 (stating that such intergovernmental conflicts
as federal-local alliances against the states are "best left to the political process").
129. See, e.g., Lillian R. Bevier, Religion in Congress and the Courts: Issues of Institutional
Competence, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 63 (1998) (calling the judiciary "hob-
bled" by its many flaws, such as "its lack of accountability").
130. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note ii, at 758.
131. See, e.g., JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW:
LEGISLATION, REGULATION AND LITIGATION 209 (2007) ("The clarity with which
Congress addresses residual state and local authority when the Congress addresses
a societal problem or regulatory need is the responsibility of Congress, especially
the staff members of the subcommittees .... ).
132. See JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PROCESS (1980) (devel-
oping the theory that led to the creation of the "process federalism" strand of po-
litical safeguards). Compare Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 550-54 (1985) (discussing the theory with approval), Marci A. Hamilton, The
Elusive Safeguards of Federalism, 574 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 93
(2000) (same), Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safe-
guards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (same), and Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Com-
position and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954)
(same), with Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Pro-
cess-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1459 (2001) (providing a critique of
the process-based theory of federalism), and Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sover-
eignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV.
341, 351 (same).
133. Bevier, supra note 129, at 62-63 ("A perfect, reliable institutional actor does not
exist."). Others have challenged congressional hegemony persuasively. See, e.g.,
Merrill, supra note 11, at 727-28.
134. Dana, supra note 85, at 549.
135. See, e.g., Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Mo. 1997) (defining "log-
rolling" as the process whereby "several matters that would not individually




"[slignificant pathologies of the democratic process," such as a lack of delibera-
tion, interest group influence, and lack of focus on specific issues.'
C. The Irrelevance of Congressional Power if States Can Evade It?
Even if Congress acts within its powers to constrain state authority, that ac-
tion could be meaningless if states can evade federal statutory mandates. To
highlight one possibility, states could respond by enacting a law preempting the
local authority that Congress has sought to preserve. However, Congress could
respond by preempting the restrictive state law, making its intentions clear in
the text of the statute.
A state also could try to get around any undesired federal authorization of
local action by employing "carrots" or "sticks" that convince local governments
to do its bidding, not the federal government's. In terms of sticks, states could,
for example, threaten to revoke local governments' home-rule status or to
withhold funding. However, states would be unlikely to yank power away from
local governments in this manner because states gain a great deal from expan-
sive local powers. For example, local government management and financing of
education, 13 7 health care, and other services for the indigent relieve burdens on
state agencies and state budgets; this role is particularly important in times of
escalating state debt,138 even as states cut down on local funding.3 9 Therefore, in
order for states to be motivated to withdraw local power, the exercise of local
authority would have to constitute a very significant threat to state interests.
136. Bernard W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation To Improve the Legislative Process:
Can It Be Done in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 1o6 (1997).
137. See, e.g., Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the
Notion of Federalism in Education Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 11-14 (2010);
Saiger, supra note 27, at 103-04 & nn.47-48 (acknowledging the importance of local
control over financing while compiling literature critical of existing local school
financing on grounds of "racism and injustice").
138. See, e.g., NICHOLAS JOHNSON, PHIL OLIFF & ERICA WILLIAMS, CTR. ON BUDGET
AND POLICY PRIORITIES, AN UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET CUTS (2011), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/3-13-o8sfp.pdf (examining how the recession has affected
state budgets); Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Mounting State Debts
Stoke Fear of a Looming Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 20o, at Ai; cf Richard C.
Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 862 (2012) (noting that state
and local fiscal crises are not a new phenomenon but instead part of normal busi-
ness cycles); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2544
(2005) (providing suggestions, inter alia, for states to update their fiscal constitu-
tional provisions to avoid endemic problems).
139. See, e.g., NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N & NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,
THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 8 (2010) ("To eliminate fiscal 2011 budget gaps, 35
states are using specific, targeted cuts [to state budgets] .... Another method be-
ing used by 19 states is to reduce aid to localities . . . .").
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Moreover, some states give local governments home-rule powers through
their state constitutions as opposed to through statutes. Constitutional
home-rule provisions provide greater protections to general-purpose local gov-
ernments in that the state legislature cannot repeal or amend them.14o Therefore,
if a local government's home-rule powers are derived from a state constitution-
al source, they can only be withdrawn if the people decide to amend the state
constitution. 41
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR CONGRESSIONAL DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE Lo-
CAL AND THE STATE
Having concluded that Congress has the power to differentiate between
state and local preemption outcomes, this Part argues that Congress should
strive to do so or at least to deliberate over state-local differences and make
clear its intentions for both levels of government in federal preemption provi-
sions. This Part proposes a framework of variables that Congress could weigh
and systematically consider when drafting preemption provisions.142 The dis-
cussion remains somewhat abstract in that Congress's final preemption choices
must depend on the specific subject matter at hand.'43
As Table 1 summarizes, Congress might seek to protect state law when its
top goals are federal uniformity with a minor degree of subfederal variation or
encouraging subfederal regulation that effectively replaces federal regulation. In
contrast, Congress might be more willing to protect local laws when its top
goals are allowing for rapid, site-specific responses and regulation; encouraging
innovation and intergovernmental learning over time; and enlisting local gov-
ernments as partners in federal activities. Finally, Congress might have no pref-
140. See, e.g., Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505,
521 (2005); see also, e.g., Cove, supra note 36, § 5.2 (noting that, even without home
rule, general-law local governments can exercise the standard police powers and
"adopt local ordinances, zoning rules, bylaws, voting procedures, and legislative
forums and procedures").
141. See, e.g., Cynthia Cumfer, Original Intent v. Modern Judicial Philosophy: Oregon's
Home Rule Case Frames the Dilemma for State Constitutionalism, 76 OR. L. REV.
909, 913 (1997).
142. Others have proposed default rules to guide not only Congress but also judges
and agencies in handling preemption questions. Their goals are similar-
increased consistency and legitimacy-but they do not engage with the question
of state-local differentiation, and therefore they identify different though overlap-
ping variables as relevant. See, e.g., McGARITY, supra note 19, at 214; Buzbee, In-
troduction, supra note 3, at 9; William W. Buzbee, Conclusion: The Menu of
Preemption Choice Variables, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 3, at 301, 302-03
[hereinafter Buzbee, Conclusion]; Thomas Hazlett, Federal Preemption in Cellular
Phone Regulation, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 2, 113, n6; Merrill, supra
note 1n, at 747.




erence between state and local law when it has imposed an optimal federal
standard or is seeking to decrease subfederal externalities and bur-
den-exportation.
Table 1
Federalism-Related Goal Favors Preemption Prefers the Preservation of
or Preservation of Which Level of Subfederal
Subfederal Law? Law (Relatively)?
Minimizing subfederal Preemption State over Local
variation
Encouraging subfederal Preservation State over Local
regulation that effectively
replaces federal regulation
Allowing site-specific Preservation Local over State
regulation
Promoting innovation and Preservation Local over State
intergovernmental learning
Enlisting local partners in Preservation Local over State
federal programs
Implementing an optimal Preemption No Preference
federal standard
Decreasing externalities Preemption No Preference
and burden-exportation
A. Situations in Which State Law Has Advantages over Local Law
State laws have certain advantages over local laws in the context of federal
preemption. This Section examines the situations in which Congress might
want to harness those advantages.
i. When Congress Seeks To Minimize Subfederal Variation
The primary reason that Congress might protect state but not local law
when drafting preemption provisions is to maintain a high'"-but not abso-
144. Congress seeks to preserve uniform federal laws in some cases to protect national
economic interests. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 835-36 (1997) ("Given
the pervasive significance of pension plans in the national economy,. . . the [Em-
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lute' 45-degree of federal uniformity. Both state and local regulation present
some threats to federal uniformity.14'6 However, Congress might find state regu-
lation to be the lesser threat.
First, both state and local regulation present courts with a challenge: Judges
fear that if they permit this subfederal law to escape preemption, similar laws
will proliferate in other jurisdictions 14 placing a greater burden on federal law.
However, local laws present a greater threat of proliferation as a matter of sheer
numbers. There are fifty states but thousands of local bodies available to mimic
each other.148
Moreover, local laws present a greater threat to federal uniformity because
they might deviate more, both from federal law and from each other. States
have a more robust uniform law movement than localities do, aided by organi-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act preemption] question is of undoubted
importance.").
145. Cf Catherine L. Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the
Battle over Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1502, 1537 (2008) (arguing that uniformity
interests should give way to other community-based interests); Roderick M. Hills,
Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Pro-
cess, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 66 (2007) (challenging the uniformity justification for
preemption on the ground that it is preferable to focus on the statutory purpose
of the challenged law).
146. Thus, when enacting the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), Con-
gress asserted the goal of "preclud[ing] a multiplicity of State and local regulations
and the potential for varying as well as conflicting regulations in the area of haz-
ardous materials transportation." Consol. Rail Corp. v. City of Bayonne, 724 F.
Supp. 320, 327 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1192, at 37 (1974)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also S. REP. No. 101-449 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4595, 4596 (using similar language). Congress expressed similar uni-
formity goals when enacting the Federal Hazardous Substances Act. See Pa. Gen.
Ins. Co. v. Landis, 96 F. Supp. 2d 408, 414 (D.N.J. 2000) (citing to various docu-
ments in the legislative history), aff d, 248 F.3d 1131 (3d Cir. 2000).
147. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 85, at 548 (discussing the fact that states copy each oth-
er's legislation, though they often fiddle with it); Motomura, supra note 15, at 2055
(describing the growth of state and local immigration initiatives and citing the
National Conference of State Legislatures' data for state laws); Kirk Johnson, State
Goes Its Own Way To Regulate Forest Roads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2012, at A12 (de-
scribing Colorado's exceptions to a federal forest "roadless" rule, and the fear that
other states will follow, creating "[a] patchwork system of rules and special inter-
ests that can speak loudly in state capitals").
148. As the phenomenon of local megafederalism would predict, see infra pp. 136-137
the same argument is made for why federal uniformity is better than state regula-
tion. See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact ofFederal Action
on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 67 (2007); Ilya
Shapiro, Tis Better To Be Regulated by One Gorilla than by Fifty Monkeys, CA-





zations such as the Uniform Law Commission of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.14 9 Therefore, if states were to step off
the federal path, they might do so in a more coordinated manner than localities
would, lessening the overall impact on uniformity. For example, if five states
were to adopt an identical law instead of adopting five distinct laws, compliance
costs and other costs of the deviation from federal uniformity would decrease
for interstate operators.' Not only are " [1] ower levels of government .. . more
likely to depart from established consensus simply because they are smaller and
more numerous," but also "a smaller unit of government is more likely to have
a population with preferences that depart from the majority's.""' The fact that
state laws are more difficult to enact than local laws also could lessen Congress's
fear that a state law will spark a chain reaction in other states. These number
and deviation threats provide a counterpoint to the argument that a single local
law "cannot wreak as much havoc with federal regulatory regimes as a state law
can."' 52
2. When Congress Seeks To Encourage Subfederal Regulation that
Effectively Replaces Federal Regulation
From the federal perspective, one of the most useful functions of state and
local governments is that they can assume responsibility over matters that the
federal government otherwise would handle.53 Congress might see states, more
than local governments, as capable of functioning as near equivalents when it
149. See Unif. Law Comm'n, About the ULC, NAT'L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM ST. LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) ("The Uni-
form Law Commission [provides] ... legislation that brings clarity and stability to
critical areas of state statutory law."); see also, e.g., Kim Quaile Hill & Patricia A.
Hurley, Uniform State Law Adoptions in the American States: An Explanatory
Analysis, 18 PUBLIUS 117 (1988).
150. Cf Dana, supra note 85, at 529 (noting that multiple alternatives to a federal
standard can be more burdensome than a single deviation).
151. McConnell, supra note 35, at 1498.
152. Chang Derek Liu, Note, The Blank Page Before You: Should the Preemption Doc-
trine Apply to Unwritten Practices?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 350, 366 (2009).
153. Indicating some sense of their mutual contributions, a Senate Report on the 1990
amendments to the CAA's preemption section regarding hazardous emissions ev-
enhandedly discussed state and local remedial regulation. See S. REP. No. 101-228
(1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3581 ("This regulatory regime provides
a significant role for State and local governments . . .") (emphasis added); see also
id. at 3633 (discussing the intent to protect both state and local regulation in a
CAA savings clause, 42 U.S.C. § 7416).
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comes to implementing federal objectives. Health care is only the most recent
area in which Congress has recognized states as near equals. 4
The confidence in state regulation comes from various sources. State legis-
lation is perceived to have greater democratic legitimacy and quality than local
regulation. State laws tend to undergo a longer enactment process and to have
more resources committed to their development, leading to greater technical
sophistication.55 More people, and a wider swath of them, typically participate
in the making of state laws, if only by voting on their state representatives.'56 In
contrast, the more localized the decision making, the more self-interested the
voting might be.1'5 Varied competing interests are also more likely to exist at the
state level, while well-resourced interests might have more of a monopoly at the
local level.
Spence and Murray speculate that the Democratic judges in their study col-
lectively preempted local laws more often than state laws because they "simply
believe that the law of the larger jurisdiction is entitled to more weight."158 Fo-
154. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified). While the fate of this law is uncertain at the moment, the
outcome of litigation challenging this Act will not affect this point.
155. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. E, Injunctive Order from Profes-
sional Lawn Care Ass'n v. Village of Milford at ii, Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier,
No. 89-1905, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) (stating that, unlike states, "local units of govern-
ment generally, particularly small cities like Milford or any of the other small cit-
ies around the country, just don't have the facilities to do the kinds of work and
research that is necessary"). But see Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
616 (1991) (rejecting the argument that "local ordinances necessarily rest on insuf-
ficient expertise"); see also, e.g., Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy and
Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Lay-
ered Regime, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,161, 11,167 (2009); Benjamin
K. Sovacool, The Best of Both Worlds: Environmental Federalism and the Need for
Federal Action on Renewable Energy and Climate Change, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 397,
430 (20o8) (discussing size issues).
156. Cf Winkler, Fatal in Theory, supra note 8o, at 822 ("In a larger polity. .. ,'a great-
er variety of parties and interests... make it less probable that a majority of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens."' (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST No. io, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
157. See generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor:
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999) (fo-
cusing on harms to welfare recipients); see also generally CLAYTON P. GILLETTE,
LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE
COURTS (2011) (investigating, among other matters, the influence of local interest
groups on redistributive programs and evaluating when, if ever, courts should in-
tervene to counter what he calls a more "malign" version of redistribution).
158. Spence & Murray, supra note 79, at 1178; see also id. (suggesting that "judges may
see local regulations as the expressions of impassioned [not-in-my-backyard]
groups whose members are numerous enough to persuade local governments but




cusing on the relevance of size to democratic preferences, David Dana has ar-
gued that Congress should consider enacting more provisions permitting varia-
tion by large states along the lines of the CAA exception for California's air
quality standards. He does so despite the assumption, "from a pure federalism
perspective," that size and number of jurisdictions should not matter."9
B. Situations in Which Local Law Has Advantages over State Law
While Congress might preserve state law but not local law to protect a lim-
ited degree of federal uniformity or to hand over certain kinds of responsibili-
ties, Congress might find local regulation more worthy of preservation from
federal preemption on other grounds. These grounds include localities' ability
to tailor laws to local conditions, to innovate, and to serve as useful partners in
specific ventures.
But to be clear, Congress only infrequently would decide to preserve local
authority while preempting state authority over the same regulatory matter.60
And nearly as infrequently would Congress decide to preserve local authority
and prohibit states from using state law to interfere with the local authority that
Congress had preserved. The potential outcry from states could be substantial.
And, as a substantive matter, the pro-state principles outlined in Section III.A
generally militate in favor of preempting local laws while saving state laws. But
the relative advantages of local regulation outlined in this Section do not neces-
sarily favor preempting state regulation. They primarily support Congress en-
suring that local regulation is protected. In other words, this Section generally
adopts the more modest position that Congress should, at a minimum, clarify
that local law as well as state law will survive preemption in situations in which
the local values identified are particularly strong.
Such a position is consonant with theories of cooperative federalism'"'-
not seeking to carve out exclusive domains of regulation but rather seeking to
majority, views"); id. n.236 (speculating additionally that local governments are
more susceptible to political pressure and thereby enact weak laws that are more
likely to be preempted).
159. See Dana, supra note 85, at 511-12 (although not comparing state with local laws,
seeming to support the conclusion that a state law would hold more weight in that
balance than a local law); see also id. at 527 ("It seems straightforward that there is
more democratic support in the case of a nonfederal standard that has been legis-
latively adopted by five large (populous) states than by one small state.").
160. See discussion supra Part II.
161. See, e.g., Zellmer, supra note 61, at 146 (describing cooperative federalism). Coop-
erative federalism goes by many names. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H.
Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 3,
at 277, 277; Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in En-
vironmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176 (2006) (identifying "dynamic federalism"
and other terms); Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMP-
TION CHOICE, supra note 3, at 33,34 ("polyphonic federalism").
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preserve flexibility and intergovernmental sharing of responsibility, including
between state and local governments. Cooperative federalism is visible in action
in various fields, from minimum wage regimes and environmental waste regu-
lation to workplace discrimination and the tax code."'z Indeed, Congress has
appeared to be less enamored by regulatory exclusivity-allocating responsibil-
ity only to one level or another-than the courts or scholars.' The waning the-
ory of dual federalism,6 " for example, envisions a regulatory stage on which two
actors'"'-the federal sovereign and the co-sovereign state-compete to estab-
lish exclusive authority over particular regulatory matters.66 However, while the
theory of cooperative federalism is more sympathetic to local authority than
dual federalism, theories of cooperative federalism still tend to focus on the fed-
eral-state dyad.
Buttressing the pro-local arguments made in this Section is a federalism
theory that I here call "local megafederalism."167 The idea is that the well-known
162. See, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601 (1991) (stating that
"FIFRA specifies several roles for state and local authorities," including some
through "cooperative agreements" with the federal government); Michael Burger,
"It's Not Easy Being Green": Local Initiatives, Preemption Problems, and the Market
Participant Exception, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 835, 853 n.104 (2010) (environment);
Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the
States in Labor-Management Relations Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 83, 83
(2009) (labor). But see ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at 21-23, 187-90 (proposing
what he sees as a more dynamic model than "dual federalism" or "cooperative
federalism"); Johanna Kalb, The Persistence of Dualism in Human Rights Treaty
Implementation, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 71 (2011) (arguing the same in the con-
text of human rights treaty implementation).
163. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 27, at 1328 (noting that "[t]he Court has been more
attentive to the formal differences between states and local government than the
scholarly advocates of federalism").
164. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of
Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 88 & n.61 (2001) (describing a "graveyard of failed
distinctions"); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1
(1950); Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent jurisdiction, and the Foreign
Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 153-67 (2001) (observing that the
Rehnquist Court abandoned dual federalism in its jurisprudence). Some see signs
of dualism reappearing at the Court, if not in Congress. See, e.g., Schapiro, supra
note 161, at 46-48.
165. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 34, at 964-65 (describing dual federalism as permit-
ting "no independent role for local governments").
166. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Conclusion: Preemption Doctrine
and Its Limits, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 2, at 309, 311 ("[E]ither federal
or state government, but not both, should handle any given matter."); Schapiro,
supra note 161, at 34 (describing " [t]he key postulates of dual federalism").
167. The modifier "mega" signifies that certain federalism traits are amplified when




arguments in favor of state regulation over federal regulation' 6 -including the
values of "participation, diversity, intergovernmental competition, political re-
sponsiveness, and innovation" ' -are only enhanced when comparing local
regulation to federal (or state) regulation. 7 o In other words, pro-state argu-
ments have even stronger force when applied to the local level. The remaining
sections of this Article draw both expressly and impliedly on the theory of local
megafederalism.
1. When Congress Wants To Allow Site-Specific Local Responses
Congress might want to preserve the special ability of local governments to
respond in a tailored manner to certain types of harms.1 7 ' "The first, and most
168. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (O'Connor, J.) (noting that
the "federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous ad-
vantages," and proceeding to list them); Davidson, supra note 34, at 1006 (citing
the "now-familiar core of arguments for limiting federal power and promoting
state authority"); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2010) ("[Wle are intimately familiar with [federalism's] bene-
fits: federalism promotes choice, competition, participation, experimentation, and
the diffusion of power. The Court reels these arguments off as easily as do schol-
ars."); Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attorney General and Preemption, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 3, at 81, 82-84 (rehearsing the goals of federal-
ism); Rodriguez, supra note 84, at 609-10 (making similar observations in the con-
text of "migration management"); Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 22, at 16-17
(compiling reasons for "preserving a state's authority and autonomy to regulate").
169. Briffault, supra note 27, at 1315.
170. See, e.g., Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2007) ("In
the sheer number of laboratories lof democracy] offered, local governments dwarf
the mere 50 states...."); Gordon, supra note 23, at 218 (noting that certain "fed-
eralist values . . occur far better on the municipal than on the state level");
Schragger, supra note 36, at 178 (same). But see D. Bruce La Pierre, Political Ac-
countability in the National Political Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of
Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 630-31 (1985) ("[T]here is no proof that
either participation or accountability is greater in the states and local govern-
ments.").
171. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1967) (stating that the "re-
sponsible and responsive operation [of local governments] is today of increasing
importance to the quality of life of more and more of our citizens"); Dana, supra
note 85, at 536 (acknowledging that state-level regulation can be easier to enact
than federal-level regulation, an argument that I transplant here to compare local
versus state law); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1745, 1784 (2005) ("Disaggregated institutions are often a solution to the problem
of mass governance."); Richard C. Schragger, The Progressive City, in WHY THE
LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 39,
48-49 (Columbia Law Sch. Nat'l State Att'y's Gen. Program & Yale Law Sch. Li-
man Pub. Interest Program eds., 2009), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/
intellectuallife/whythelocalmatters.htm.
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axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that local laws can be
adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while a national government must
take a uniform-and hence less desirable-approach."' According to this met-
ric, and consistent with local megafederalism, "[s]tates are preferable governing
units to the federal government, and local government to states."'
The perception of special local responsiveness reflects the idea that local
governments engage citizens in the political process better than state govern-
ments do,17 4 just as states respond more quickly than the federal government,
providing opportunities for political participation.75 Local governments pro-
vide venues for debating critical public issues.176 In turn, local politicians learn
quickly about local concerns so that they can tailor legislation to resolve those
problems.
Congress might be particularly careful to preserve local regulations that ad-
dress site-specific harms.'7 Federal and even state regulation can be ill-suited to
resolve local problems. Legislative histories often sound the theme of needing to
preserve local flexibility in order to permit local governments to solve inherent-
ly local problems.'18
172. McConnell, supra note 35, at 1493.
173. Id. at 1494.
174. See, e.g., Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 22, at 17 (noting that "[allthough it
has been a benefit claimed for federalism," the "goal of stimulating greater citizen
engagement may logically lead to calls for concentrating power in localities");
Gerken, supra note 168, at 30 ("If you care about participation, look down."). See
generally Frug, supra note 48 (providing a classic argument for the value of local
political participation).
175. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575 n.18 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) ("The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy oc-
curs at local levels of government, where people with firsthand knowledge of local
problems have more ready access to public officials. . .. "); Richard T. Ford, Law's
Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 844 (1999); Sullivan, su-
pra note 32, at 1935 ("It is no historical accident that the 'town meeting' is the
dominant political metaphor of our American republic."); cf Richard Briffault,
Our Localism: Part I-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 393-99
(1990).
176. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147
U. PA. L. REV. 487, 491 (1999).
177. See Gerken, supra note 168, at 45 ("[A] centralized decisionmaker might think it's
quite a good idea to encourage . .. tailoring at the local level."); Ken Starr, Preface
to FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 2, at xiii (describing how Americans "intui-
tively recoil from the idea of 'one size fits all,' the proposition that our hopes for
happiness and fulfillment somehow lie in beneficent national measures reaching
into our smallest communities and neighborhoods").
178. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 9 9 -253(V) (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3220
(amending CERCLA); 136 CONG. REC. 16,877, 16,883 (1990) (statement of Sen.




The concept of "subsidiarity" provides additional ammunition for these ar-
guments. An influential concept in Europe but also prevalent in the United
States,'7 9 subsidiarity theory posits that power and responsibility should be de-
volved to the lowest level of government capable of exercising it well.So The
higher level of government must justify its retention of authority over a given
matter."' Therefore, to the extent that Congress concludes accurately that local
governments are better suited than states to perform a certain task, a federal law
assigning that task to the local government is superior to one that assigns that
task to the states (or the federal government).
Local governments also have a comparative functional advantage when
regulating those matters traditionally considered part of the local realm." Local
CONG. REC. 3712 (1990) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (quoting a letter from the
President's Council on Economic Advisers declaring, inter alia, that "failure to
provide local areas with the necessary authority and flexibility to solve local prob-
lems adds needless costs"). Emerging literature on local land-use models supports
this perspective. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive
Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 277 (2005) (arguing, in-
ter alia, for the integration of local land-use collaborative processes instead of
"[r]etrospectively limiting the discretion of those best placed to resolve disputes");
Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 289 (2011) (proposing an approach to facilities siting called "process
preemption" that leaves most authority in local hands but incorporates federal
limits).
179. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devo-
lution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103, 123 (2001) ("[Mluch of this country's political and legal
landscape comports fully with subsidiarity's ideal."); Jared Bayer, Comment,
Re-Balancing State and Federal Power: Toward a Political Principle of Subsidiarity
in the United States, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1421, 1472 (2004).
180. See Blank, supra note 32, at 540 ("[W]ho can disagree with the idea that every de-
cision or governmental function should be given to the 'smallest' and 'closest-to-
the-citizen' jurisdiction, under the condition that such jurisdiction can perform it
efficiently?"); Alex Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the United States:
Subsidiarity, Private Law, and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 369, 376
(2010) (noting that subsidiarity is "increasingly invoked... in support of argu-
ments for devolution toward greater local government").
181. Mills, supra note 180, at 377; see also George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seri-
ously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 331, 405 (1994) (discussing the democratic participation justifications for
subsidiarity).
182. See Utah v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) (noting that "[i]n grant-
ing cities and counties the power to enact ordinances to further the general wel-
fare, the Legislature no doubt took such political realities into consideration");
Davidson, supra note 34, at 961; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of
the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 441 (2002)
("[I1n functional analysis of the values that federalism serves, the significance of
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governments bring tremendous resources to bear on matters of immediate, pal-
pable concern to residents. Consider street maintenance, law enforcement,
emergency medical services, traffic control, drinking water, sewage, and waste
management:8 1 While the state might set priorities and provide some funding
to the locality to deal with these issues, local governments manage them. The
increasing scholarly focus on the role of local special-purpose districts, as op-
posed to local general-purpose governments, has trained our attention on the
local bodies providing those and other services.184 Among other benefits, these
tailored bodies match the scope of government to the scope of the problem."'
Although Congress should consider which level of government traditionally
has handled the regulatory matter at issue when deciding whether to preempt
or not, such lines have proven difficult, if not impossible, to draw in the federal
versus subfederal context."' Drawing lines between state and local regulation is
similarly difficult: Both can exercise the state's police power, they often share
regulatory authority, and their competencies can change over time."' Attempts
local governments is enormous."); Gerken, supra note 168, at 23; cf Briffault, su-
pra note 175, at 393 (finding no "compelling normative basis" for localism in the
local-autonomy-protecting theme of "efficiency in the provision of public sector
goods and services").
183. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 439
(2002) (highlighting the particular competencies of localities to regulate street and
highway safety, an area in which "States have traditionally allowed localities to
address local concerns").
184. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 168, at 30 (discussing the place of special-purpose in-
stitutions in federalism); Camille Pannu, Comment, Drinking Water and Exclu-
sion: A Case Study from California's Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223 (2012)
("The phrase 'special-purpose district' is a local government law term of art; it re-
fers to any local government formed with a fairly narrow or specific purpose in
mind."); cf Young, supra note 36, at 65 (suggesting that limiting federal preemp-
tion through doctrines that protect autonomy would "benefit all governmental
entities further down the food chain").
185. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 7, at 13-15 (noting that special-purpose gov-
ernments are the "most common form of local government in the United States
today").
186. See, e.g., Baker & Young, supra note 164, at 87-88 (describing a "graveyard of failed
distinctions"); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the
Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 621-22 (2001) (offering empirical reasons that
line-drawing is difficult). The trend is reflected in Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1995). Nevertheless,
matters such as crime, poverty, and family matters clearly tend to be dedicated to
the states, and foreign relations and immigration to the federal government. Cf
Rodriguez, supra note 84, at 572 (seeing "functional, structural reasons" for the
Court's dedication of immigration matters to the federal government).
187. See, e.g., Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 42, at 1354-55 ("The prevailing conception




to distinguish them often end in frustration.' 8 Nevertheless, legislatures and
courts distinguish the two regularly, such as when courts hear state challenges
to local regulations on state-law-preemption grounds.'" And state constitutions
detail nonexclusive categories of what kinds of activities constitute so-called
municipal affairs.9'9 Scholars also attempt to categorize the relative institutional
competencies of state versus local governments. 9 '
Moreover, as a practical matter, state and local governments do not devote
equal time and resources to all matters. For example, while both state and local
governments have land-use responsibilities,1 92 land-use regulation ends up be-
ing primarily a local responsibility-even a pillar of local law' 93-as environ-
mental law seems increasingly to be becoming. 94 Formal powers also differ be-
tween state and local governments. States have the power to enact
188. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643, 661 (1964).
189. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 42, at 1344-45, 1349-50; see also, e.g., Johnson v.
Bradley, 4 Cal. 4 th 389, 398 (1992) (establishing a "dialectical" approach to catego-
rizing matters as "municipal affairs").
190. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 44, at 2326-28; Briffault, supra note 27, at 1343.
191. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 42, at 1354.
192. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (citing "the States' traditional and primary power over land
and water use").
193. See, e.g., N. Haven Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Upjohn Co., 753 F. Supp. 423,
427 (D. Conn. 1990) ("Local land use decisions have repeatedly been held to be is-
sues of local concern."); Ostrow, supra note 178, at 296 ("That local governments
were primarily empowered to regulate land is not a historical accident. Rather, lo-
cal primacy in this area of law stems from a practical recognition that local gov-
ernments are institutionally better suited to this task than are higher levels of gov-
ernment."); cf Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEo. L.J. 1985,
1993 (2000) (discussing the ways in which delegation of local land-use control has
led to "highly exclusionary zoning and developmental policies," and the fact that
"homogeneous localities can give effect to their worst biases").
194. See, e.g., City of Chesapeake v. Sutton Enters., Inc., 138 F.R.D. 468, 475 (E.D. Va.
1990); cf. Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1446 (S.D.
Cal. 1988) ("[T]raditional land use and zoning decisions at the local level are nec-
essarily intertwined with concerns about human health and the environment,
over which the EPA has also been given regulatory authority in this instance.").
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civil-relationship laws and to punish serious crimes,' 95 a power that localities
lack. And trespass'9' and other torts are matters of state law.
The local-twist preemption provisions identified in Part I indicate that
Congress is attuned to such distinct subject-matter competencies. These provi-
sions in part rely on local concerns to determine state outcomes.
2. When Congress Wants To Promote Innovation and Intergovern-
mental Learning
Congress sometimes chooses not to preempt subfederal regulation so that it
can encourage learning over time. The goal is to allow regulators to gain infor-
mation from each other and improve federal laws incrementally.' 97
I focus here on experimentation as the mechanism for such intergovern-
mental learning. Perhaps no feature of subfederal governance is lauded more
frequently than its association with innovation.9' Local regulation often is con-
sidered more innovative than state regulation (a megafederalist phenomenon),
whether because the sheer number of local governments increases the chances
of a good idea emerging or because it is relatively easier to get a local law enact-
ed and tested out in practice. As a result, Congress might be particularly moti-
vated to protect local regulation when it recognizes the need for innovation.'99
Localities have experimented, for example, with environmental and
health-care regulation, from New York City's climate change regulations20 0 to
195. See Briffault, supra note 27, at 1343; see also Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532
U.S. 141, 155 (2001) (state family and probate law); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833,
840 (1997) (community property).
196. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180 (1978) (trespass).
197. Michael C. Dorf& Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (stressing mutual learning).
198. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Fighting Federalism with Federalism: IfIt's Not Just a Bat-
tle Between Federalists and Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081,
2091 (2oo6) (stating that experimentalism has been called the "essence to consti-
tutional federalism"). Local multiplicity is important not only because local ex-
perimentation leads to better laws but also because such flourishing is good in and
of itself.
199. Cf Exec. Order 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 26, 1987) (emphasizing, inter alia,
the need to recognize and encourage local regulation).
200. See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1097, 1106, 1153 (2009); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Gov-
ernments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 669, 677, 731-32 (2010); see also Allway Taxi, Inc. v. City of New York, 34o F.
Supp. 1120, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("[B]oth the history and text of the [CAA] show
that the... preemption section was [not made] to hamstring localities in their




San Francisco's employer health care pay-or-play law.20 ' Localities also have
been active in labor and employment initiatives, such as living-wage and
wage-theft laws.m The same is true for anti-immigrant state and local laws,2 0 3 as
well as state and local laws seeking to integrate immigrants into communities.2 04
So-called "affirmative litigation units" emerging in city and county attorney of-
fices have supported such initiatives.2 0 When seeking innovative solutions to
ongoing problems and the kind of intergovernmental communication that co-
cab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2010) (preempting the
city's attempt to encourage the use of hybrid taxis).
201. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A
Case Study of the Failure of Regulation, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 35 (1996). Compare
Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.
2009) (denying petition for rehearing en banc), with Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v.
Fielder, 475 F-3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v.
N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (calorie-count law); Charles R.
Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of Antismoking Poli-
cies from U.S. Cities to States, so AM. J. POL. Sci. 825, 828, 840 (20o6); Stephanie
Rosenbloom, Calorie Data To Be Posted at Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2010, at Bi; Sara Bonisteel, Toys Banned in Some California Fast Food Restaurants,
CNN (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/20o/LIVING/04/28/fast.food.toys
.california/index.html.
202. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Labor in Los Ange-
les, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1617 (2011); Catherine L. Fisk, The Anti-Subordination Princi-
ple of Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 5 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REV. 17 (2011);
Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to
Antipoverty Arguments?, i U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 4 (2009) (noting the "vibrant role"
of minimum wage laws "in state and local economic justice campaigns").
203. See, e.g., Maria Marulanda, Preemption, Patchwork Immigration Laws, and the Po-
tential for Brown Sundown Towns, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 321, 368 (2010); Lindsay
Nash, Expression by Ordinance: Preemption and Proxy in Local Legislation, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 243 (2011); Daniel Eduardo Guzmdn, Note, "There Be No Shelter
Here": Anti-Immigrant Housing Ordinances and Comprehensive Reform, 20 COR-
NELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 399 (2010).
204. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors, Cnty. of Santa Clara, Calif., Policy Resolution
2011-504: Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Clara Adding
Board Policy 3.54 Relating to Civil Immigration Detainer Requests (Oct. 18, 2011),
available at http://acjusticeproject.files.wordpress.com/20n/io/detainerpolicy.pdf;
Christopher Carlberg, Note, Cooperative Noncooperation: A Proposal for an Effec-
tive Uniform Noncooperation Immigration Policy for Local Governments, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 740, 759 (2009); Gail Robinson, Bill Curtails City Role in Deporta-
tions, GOTHAM GAZETTE (N.Y.C.) (NOV. 4, 2011), http://www.gothamgazette
.com/article/searchlight/20111o4/203/3630; cf Rodriguez, supra note 84, at 631 (ar-
guing that "Congress should adopt a presumption against preemption" when
communities regulate immigration matters to encourage integration).
205. See Kathleen Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in Local
Public Law Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS, supra note 171, at 51.
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operative federalism prizes, Congress therefore might be particularly careful to
protect local laws.
Before moving on to the next variable, I pause to play out Congress's op-
tions if it seeks to establish a federal floor. The phrase "floor preemption" refers
to Congress's choice to preempt "state regulations weaker than those in the fed-
eral statutes," while "ceiling preemption" describes Congress's choice in a fed-
eral statute to set a "maximum standard but allow[] weaker state regula-
tions."2 0 6 In some situations, Congress might want to preempt both state and
local laws that fall below a floor that it has set but allow local law to go farther
above the federal floor than state law. Innovation might be particularly neces-
sary on a given matter, but uniformity might remain somewhat important.2 07
There would not be too much risk, and potentially would be some gains, if
Congress were to let local governments go farther above that floor than states.
Congress could even specify that only a certain number of local govern-
ments is free to innovate (or that only certain kinds of them may do so, as dis-
cussed in Part IV). Spurring innovation might be important enough in the con-
text of a particular substantive statutory program that Congress will permit dis-
discrete divergence from the federal rule through a contained number of local
deviations. Congress thereby could gain some of the benefits of permitting ex-
perimentation while not permitting an objectionable level of impact on federal
uniformity. In contrast, permitting two large states (or many local govern-
ments) to experiment could have too large of an impact. While in Section III.A
I argue that state laws might have less of an impact on federal uniformity than
local laws, here I contemplate only a certain number of local governments ex-
perimenting.
3. When Congress Wants To Enlist Local Partners in Federal Pro-
grams
Finally, Congress might want to retain local authority when it seeks to cul-
tivate local partnerships to effectuate a federal regulatory program. In other
words, Congress sometimes perceives local institutions to be the most desirable
partners.
A major strand in recent literature disentangling the local from the state has
demonstrated the importance of federal-local collaborations. These collabora-
206. Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, u8 YALE L.J. 868, 896
n.1o1 (2009); see also, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 17,232 (1990) (statement of Sen. Jef-
fords) (saying that he was "especially pleased that the conferees were able to in-
clude provisions [hel had supported," including "phasing out CFC's without
preempting State and local authority to enact stricter regulations").
207. As discussed in Subsection III.A.1, if uniformity is a more significant yet not over-




tions sometimes deliberately bypass the states.20s For example, a prolonged his-
tory of direct federal grants to localities (particularly to large urban govern-
ments)2 0 9 has displaced states in certain instances."o Nestor Davidson developed
the theory of "cooperative localism" to describe such "direct relations between
the federal government and local governments." "
Federal partnering with local governments need not lead to a conflict with
the states. However, if the states resist, or if state law conflicts with the role envi-
sioned for local governments, Congress can preempt the state law that interferes
with the ability of the locality to further the federal scheme."1 For example, such
a conflict between federal and state objectives is likely looming in the world of
broadband. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009213 carved out
$7.2 billion for the development of broadband infrastructure and services. Con-
gress in part sought to enhance the role of local governments in broadband ser-
vices-both as owners and providers of broadband services, and as regulators of
broadband activity. 14 Partly in response to lobbying by private providers seek-
ing to squelch local competition, at least nineteen states had preempted the lo-
cal provision of broadband as of December 2011.215
208. Davidson, supra note 34, at lo21 ("Congress, at times with the Court's blessing,
interferes directly with the internal structuring of state governments in a variety of
contexts.").
209. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 22, at 4 (citing the President's proposal for a Federal
Office of Urban Policy as a sign that "states and their cities might not be best
viewed as one and the same").
210. See Barron, supra note 5, at 378-90 (discussing the ways in which exercises of fed-
eral power can empower local governments); id. at 380 (noting that Congress, "al-
tering the background framework within which local power is exercised," can
"creat[e] new opportunities for exercising local power"); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is
Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL.
187, 197 n.25 (2005).
211. See Davidson, supra note 34, at 960.
212. See supra Part II.
213. Pub. L. No. in-5, 123 Stat. 115.
214. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 124, at 592-93 (noting that recent federal programs
have "targeted localities, at times requiring that certain funds be granted to local
governments"). See generally Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 74 OHIo ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2013) (draft on file with author) (developing support for feder-
al-local collaborations that encourages the municipal provision of broadband in
part because of the very local nature of broadband).
215. See Sylvain, supra note 214, at 20 n.76 (discussing lobbying, as well as delay tactics
such as litigation, employed to slow down local initiatives); Anthony E. Varo-
na, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 98-100
(2009) (criticizing these protectionist efforts); see also, e.g., Dunne, supra note 123,
at 1128 ("[W]here federal preemption may actually further the ultimate goals of
federalism by allowing local governments to respond to issues of particular local
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C. Situations in Which State-Local Differences Do Not Matter
Generally speaking, state-local differences seem relatively insignificant in at
least two situations: when Congress feels that it has identified an optimal solu-
tion, and when it preempts subfederal regulation to prevent burden exporta-
tion.
I. When Congress Seeks To Implement an Optimal Federal Solution
Congress sometimes develops regulatory solutions that it believes to be so
optimal that it wants to exclude any deviation.2"6 Enforcing such optimal stand-
ards thus can result in economies of scale. An optimal standard is different,
therefore, from setting a regulatory floor or setting a regulatory ceiling. 17 Con-
gress's decision that it has found an optimal solution is particularly appropriate
when Congress builds in flexibility for adaptation or a sunset provision.218 In
other words, Congress can mitigate risks by requiring preemption clauses to
sunset unless renewed.
Both state and local regulation come out relatively evenly under this varia-
ble. Optimal means optimal. If Congress (or a federal agency) truly believes that
the federal government has identified the right solution to a puzzle, any differ-
ent solution potentially threatens that choice.
concern," as in the broadband context, "Gregory v. Ashcroft's presumption against
preemption may be counterproductive."); Christopher Mitchell, Georgia Legisla-
ture To Revoke Local Authority To Build Networks, COMMUNITY BROADBAND
NETWORKS (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.muninetworks.org/content/georgia
-legislature-revoke-local-authority-build-networks.
216. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1549-55 (2007) (identifying "uni-
tary federal choice" preemption as a third category in addition to floor and ceiling
preemption); see also Steel Inst. of N.Y. v. City of New York, No.
09-civ-6539(CM), 2011 WL 6778502, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 201) ("There are ...
circumstances where it is evident that Congress (or an agency) intended its regu-
lation to serve as both a 'floor' and a 'ceiling,' putting any contrary State regula-
tion at all into conflict with the Federal purpose." (citing Geier v. Am. Honda, 529
U.S. 861 (2000))); Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of Federal Preemption: Refor-
mulating the Black Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 25, 35-36 (2005) ("Findings of fed-
eral preemption are often rooted in the need to protect federal resolutions of
problems requiring the balancing of competing objectives-cases where Congress
or a federal agency has arrived at what is assertedly an optimal level of regula-
tion.").
217. See supra Subsection II.B.2 (discussing floors and ceilings).




2. When Congress Wants To Decrease Externalities and Bur-
den-Exportation
Another common reason why Congress seeks to preempt state and local
laws is to prevent these actors from exporting burdens and externalities to other
jurisdictions while retaining benefits for themselves. 9 This behavior can take
the form of economic balkanization and excessive competition.2 2 o Such behav-
ior, the theory goes, can harm markets, reduce feedback to regulators, and lead
to discrimination.' Courts have found, for example, that a preemption provi-
sion in the Interstate Commerce Act "is entirely consistent with the Congres-
sional transportation policies to deregulate certain areas of commerce" and
may promote 'competitive and efficient services' by allowing national carriers
like Greyhound to compete with entrenched local carriers."22 2
The exclusionary and parochial quality of local laws, including "not-in-my-
backyard" tendencies, is a favorite target of criticism. 2 2 They are also feared for
their potential to discriminate against outsiders or against minorities.2 4 These
accusations are enhanced versions of those leveled against the states by federal
219. Epstein & Greve, supra note 2, at 312 (describing cost externalization); see also 136
CONG. REC. 35,016 (1990) (statement of Rep. Rinaldo) (observing that, "[flor
those of us in New Jersey, it is equally important that this bill addresses the air
pollution that comes into our State from other areas" so as not to "suffer be-
cause... [our] neighbors have looser standards"). Some commentators temper
the force of this consideration by observing that spillover effects can be positive.
See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 84, at 638.
220. Cf Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 338 (2008) (noting the tension between
"the Framers' distrust of economic Balkanization" and the notion of federalism,
which "favorfs] a degree of local autonomy").
221. Hazlett, supra note 142; see also Merrill, supra note 61, at 183 (citing examples); id.
at 174-79 (deriving a balkanization default rule from three preemption clauses).
222. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of New Orleans ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 339, 345 (E.D. La. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 131ol(a)(2)).
223. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 389-90
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[U]nlike States, municipalities are more apt to
promote their narrow parochial interests 'without regard to extraterritorial im-
pact and regional efficiency."' (quoting Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 453
U.S. 389, 404 (1978))); Rollins Envtl. Servs. (FS), Inc. v. St. James Parish, 775 F.2d
627, 635 (5th Cir. 1985) (describing local laws as "sham[s]"); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of City Power, 113
HARv. L. REV. 2009, 2011-12 (2000) (noting that the flip side of local power is "the
social inequality and parochialism that local governments also seem to promote").
224. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 175, at 453 (noting that "local boundaries mark racial
and class inequalities as well as the divisions between jurisdictions"); Davidson,
supra note 34, at 1014, 1024-26; Ford, supra note 175, at 926 ("Local autonomy may
protect gay rights ordinances in Aspen and Denver, but it would also allow an-
tigay laws in more conservative jurisdictions such as Cincinnati.").
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power advocates, supported by history: The federal government added the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and enacted civil-rights laws
to address state bigotry, for example.
However, state laws resulting in negative externalities for surrounding
states could have a heavier impact on other jurisdictions than do local laws.
Senator Chris Dodd expressed this concern about state-level impacts (although
he did not compare them to local impacts) during the CAA debates. He lauded
the creation of a regional commission with the power to force individual states
to cut their pollution, stating that, without it, "my home State of Connecticut
probably never would be able to meet Federal standards, because so many pol-
lutants are blown in from neighboring States."2 5 And when explaining the OSH
Act's uniformity provisions, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted
that Congress favored uniformity for similar anti-exportation purposes-"so
that those states providing vigorous protection would not be disadvantaged by
those that did not."1226
State and local regulation appear to come out relatively evenly under this
variable. The potential for greater deviation at the local level might matter when
thinking about impacts on federal uniformity, as discussed above. But it is not
relevant to the question of negative externalities.
3. The Value of Deliberation
Increased deliberation under the framework laid out above could lead to a
variety of benefits. Perhaps most important, if Congress deliberates over
state-local differences pursuant to this framework, it might craft better statutes.
It could better match up regulatory capability with regulatory authority."'
Congress might also produce more innovative preemption arrangements.2"
Furthermore, the benefits of deliberation can transcend whatever policy
choices Congress ultimately makes. 9 Even if Congress ultimately decides to
225. 136 CONG. REC. 17,749, 17,750 (1990) (statement of Sen. Dodd); see also 136 CONG.
REC. 12,848, 12,874 (1990) (statement of Rep. Rinaldo).
226. United Steelworkers v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 734 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing the legisla-
tive history of the OSH Act).
227. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 405, 457 (1989) (identifying one goal of interpretive principles as "improving
lawmaking").
228. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at 192 (recommending, for example, that fed-
eral laws offer incentives to states to enact legislation compatible with federal re-
gimes, and that federal laws provide opt-out provisions); see also O'REILLY, supra
note 131, at 207 (summarizing additional pre-enactment and post-enactment pro-
posals in JOSEPH ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION (1991)).
229. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1549-56





treat state and local regulation as equivalents in a given text--or to be deliber-
ately vague-so long as it does so pursuant to considered deliberation, we
might have gained something. Indeed, in some situations Congress might want
to leave preemption and savings clauses ambiguous to give courts flexibility.
While perhaps increasing the chance of judicial error, such a tactic could serve
as a hedge against congressional error, if Congress, for example, lacks the facts it
needs to made a better allocation of authority.2"O Looking earlier in the process,
increased deliberation can improve notice of potentially preemptive legislation
to local and state governments. Such notice can enhance political safeguards,
allowing subfederal governments to protect their interests231 and answering Ern-
est Young's call for "doctrines that focus on correcting defects in the political
process' own protection of federalism."' Even if political safeguards have
weakened over time, they still function as "veto gates."233 Although the literature
on political safeguards, like other federalism theories, generally focuses on the
state-federal dyad" 4 it appears that both state and local governments are pre-
pared to respond to federal legislation that has preemptive effects.3 5 Giving
state and local governments advance notice also is more efficient than letting
state and local governments try to correct perceived problems through amicus
230. Congress acknowledged as much when explaining why it chose not to include a
preemption clause in the Atomic Energy Act: Congress not only believed that the
regulation had a broad preemptive sweep such that a preemption clause was un-
necessary, but also wanted to let courts determine "matters on the fringe of the
preempted areas," such as "certain types of zoning requirements." United States v.
City of New York, 463 F. Supp. 604, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting congressional
hearings).
231. Courts could institute a mandatory notification system letting state governments
know about relevant litigation to address such concerns post-enactment. See
Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 781, 807 (2008).
232. Young, supra note 36, at 4.
233. Clark, supra note 117, at 196 (citation omitted).
234. See, e.g., JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: How STATES PROTECT
THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 4 (2009); cf Gerken, supra note
168, at 34-35 (highlighting the flaws of process federalism, including that it is
grounded in sovereignty and therefore less protective of local governance).
235. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 362 (1991); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemp-
tion, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 762 (2004); Pursley, supra note 19, at 572 (describing
the "more than sixty organizations representing state and local governments and
government officials"); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agen-
cy-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2162 (2009) (describing the so-called "Big
Seven" associations of state, county, and city government officials); PREEMPTION
MONITOR (NCSL Law & Criminal Justice Comm., Denver, Colo.) (Apr. 7, 2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=20109; see also, e.g., Links, PREEMPTION &
MOVEMENT BUILDING IN PUB. HEALTH, http://www.preemptionwatch.org/links/
(last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
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briefs in subsequent litigation' or by seeking post-enactment amendments or
repeals.
Moreover, under the status quo, states likely are more frequent and forceful
lobbyists than are local governments, and they thereby get more congressional
attention.2 37 Rigorous deliberation about both local and state capacities could
increase Congress's attention to local regulation.3 Increased attention, howev-
er, could translate into increased preemption of local law in situations in which,
with less thought, Congress might have preserved local authority. Other values
of increased deliberation on state-local differences could include more attention
to the broader federalism impacts of preemption-perhaps leading to more
careful legislation overall 39-and richer legislative history, aiding future
courts.2 40
Every proposal has its drawbacks. Increased deliberation could make
preemption provisions even more of a bargaining chip than they currently are.
Indeed, "most preemption clauses have been 'a last minute compromise in a
massive piece of new legislation."' 4 ' But perhaps greater deliberation would
ameliorate the last-minute and bargaining-chip nature of preemption decisions.
236. We do not know much about state versus local influences and resources during
litigation. See Pursley, supra note 19, at 574 & n.266 (noting the need for further re-
search on the priorities and success of state and local organizations).
237. The degree of power that state and local interests wield over Congress is debated.
See, e.g., Pursley, supra note 19, at 573-75; Ernest Young, Two Cheers for Process
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1358 (2001); cf Ron Nixon, In Post-Earmark Era,
Small Cities Step Up Lobbying To Fight for Federal Grants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2012,
at A17.
238. See, e.g., Sharpe, supra note ii, at 434 ("[M]ost federalism issues can be cured by
permitting states, localities, and state and local interest groups an opportunity to
meaningfully participate in the deliberative process before agencies promulgate
preemption regulations.").
239. See Tenth Amendment Enforcement Act of 1996. Hearing on S. 1629 Before the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 1o4th Cong. 52 (1996) (statement of Rep. Patrick
Sweeney, Minority Leader, Ohio House of Representatives, on behalf of Nat'l
Conf. of State Legislatures) ("We only occasionally hear a meaningful debate on
the federalism implications of preemptive bills."); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at
192 ("Congress should examine the broader federalism implications of the bill to
ensure it achieves national goals without unnecessarily removing powers from
states and their political subdivisions.").
240. Cf James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 901
(2011) (arguing that, even when statutory text is relatively clear, courts will turn to
legislative history for confirmation or corroboration of their interpretation).
241. O'REILLY, supra note 131, at 54 (quoting Fisk, supra note 201, at 35, 102); id. at 54-57
(describing the other matters that drown out close consideration of preemption
during enactment and the fact that members barter over preemption provisions);
id. at 57 ("[R]eal experience ... breeds a profound skepticism of the role that con-




IV. IMPLEMENTING CONGRESSIONAL DIFFERENTIATION
This Part outlines additional mechanisms available to Congress, courts, and
agencies to help implement the project of state-local differentiation.
A. Congressional Tools for Softening the Effects of Interference with State Au-
thority
One remaining question is how Congress can soften the effects of interfer-
ence with state authority while implementing the framework proposed in Part
III. Some suggestions follow.
i. Accommodating Existing State Structures
Congress might decide to specify divergent outcomes for local and state
regulation in preemption provisions. If so, to lessen the impact on state au-
thority, Congress could build on existing state structures and otherwise ac-
commodate existing differences between local governments. Precedent exists:
Congress regularly seeks to build on existing state and local programs when en-
acting federal legislation. 42
Congress, for example, might wish to vary its preemption provisions based
on size and type of local government. Even putting aside state authority con-
cerns, the term "local" covers up meaningful variations among local govern-
ments for which Congress might want to account. 43 The United States has an
estimated 90,ooo local governments, 44 some general-purpose and others spe-
cial-purpose. Some local governments are large enough to resemble or even
surpass states. Los Angeles County adopted a 2011 budget of $23 billion and has
almost io million residents;2 45 New York City adopted a Fiscal Year 2012 budget
cussed the vicissitudes of the political process that likely led to the enactment of
FIFRA's preemption provisions. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
620-21 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
242. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7 4 12(d)(7) (2006) (protecting state authority to establish a
"more stringent emission limitation or other applicable requirement" under the
CAA); 136 CONG. REc. 3673 (1990) (statement of Rep. Michael Bilirakis) (stating
that the EPA should "incorporate State permit programs" as much as possible and
not "disrupt[]" them).
243. I do not address regional governance here; for an exploration of that topic, see, for
example, Cashin, supra note 193, at 1997 (discussing the importance of regional
solutions); Davidson, supra note 34, at 962 (turning to regionalism to "temper[]
the scope of federal power and local autonomy"); and id. at 1023.
244. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 7.
245. Garrett Therolf, L.A. County Supervisors OK $23-Billion Budget, L.A. TIMES, June
7, 2010 (Extra), at AA.
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of $66 billion and has more than 8 million residents.4 6 In contrast, Wyoming
projected a Fiscal Year 2011-2012 (24-month) budget of approximately $3 billion
and has about 5oo,ooo residents.2 47 Indeed, Congress could account for varia-
tions in the size of state governments, as well for the various kinds of state regu-
latory authority within a single state.248
Moreover, Congress could divvy up responsibilities according to the ways
in which states have allocated local home-rule powers and the ways in which
states have classified local governments. State structures thus would provide the
baseline for how Congress thinks about local authority. Laurie Reynolds recent-
ly has argued that Congress's failure to accommodate existing state decisions
regarding state-local allocation of powers-through an excessive focus on state
sovereignty-actually insults the states. 49 Similarly, I argue that paying atten-
tion to existing state structures might respect state sovereignty in a useful man-
ner.
To begin with, Congress could incorporate existing state schemes for
home-rule jurisdictions. Almost all states-forty-eight according to a recent
countzso-have granted some form of home rule to at least some of their local
governments through constitutional and statutory provisions "that explicitly
identif[y] towns and cities as legally independent entities."' Because states have
developed a wide variety of models for devolving powers through home rule,
Congress could assume that the local governments to which states have given
home-rule powers are also the ones that states would be most willing to see ex-
ercising authority in partnership with a federal scheme"2 -that is, states con-
sider those local governments to be the most capable of exercising independent
246. See, e.g., Henry Goldman, New York City Council Approves $66 Billion 2o12 Budget
Restoring Teachers, BLOOMBERG (June 29> 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2on-o6-29/DOW-york-city-council-approves-66-bnion-2012-budget-restoring
-some-cuts.html.
247. WYOMING STATE BUDGET: 2011-2012 BIENNIUM 3 (2010), available at http://ai.state
.wy.us/budget/pdf/2011/2011-12StateBudget.pdf.
248. Cf Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representation, and Federal Safe-
guards, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 977 (2002) ("States today (and arguably always) are
fragmented and diverse entities."); Hills, supra note 47, at 1201 (unpacking the
"'black box' of the 'state"' in the context of federal delegations of powers to state
and local entities, despite the opposition of state legislators).
249. See Laurie Reynolds, A Role for Local Government Law in Federal-State-Local Dis-
putes, 43 URB. LAW. 977, 980-81 (2011).
250. Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Tradi-
tional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 371, 383 (2008).
251. Barron, supra note 44, at 2278.
252. Cf Dunne, supra note 123, at 1148 (noting that in Missouri Municipal League, the
"Court admits in a footnote that the hypothetical cases being discussed indeed are
'general law'-i.e., Dillon's Rule-states rather than home rule states" (quoting




action. For example, if a state has granted home rule to cities with populations
over o,ooo residents, Congress could provide that those are the cities that
would benefit from savings provisions. Or Congress could decide that
non-home-rule cities would benefit most, depending on the type of activity that
Congress wants to encourage. Congress also could consider differentiating be-
tween local governments that operate under the so-called "imperio" form of
home rule (meaning that they have great autonomy over "local" or "municipal"
matters within their own imperial realm) 5 and those that operate under "legis-
lative" home rule (which gives local governments the power to act independent-
ly so long as the state has not preempted such action). However, such a division
could create great confusion; for example, some home-rule configurations ex-
hibit a mix of imperio and legislative elements.
Moreover, many states establish different "classes" among their local juris-
dictions. Such classes determine whether they can exercise home-rule powers or
more specific powers (such as taxation).5 4 Other states do not so differenti-
ate.' For example, the Michigan Constitution provides home-rule powers to
all cities and villages that choose to embrace such powers.256
When engaging in such differentiation, Congress or regulatory agencies
should think about the consequences. For example, they can clarify whether
their specifications should prevent local governments from partnering with
each other or from collaborating at a regional level where appropriate.
253. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. ni, § 5(a) ("City charters adopted pursuant to this Con-
stitution . . . with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent
therewith."); cf 45 CAL. JUR. 3D Municipalities § 187 (2011) (noting that what con-
stitutes a municipal affair is left to the courts for case-by-case adjudication).
254. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. XI, § io ("Any city containing a population of ten
thousand inhabitants, or more, shall be permitted to frame a charter for its own
government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this
state.. .. "); Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709, 711 (Wash. 2001) ("Thus,
a first class city [in Washington] may, without sanction from the legislature, legis-
late regarding any local subject matter."); Barron, supra note 44, at 2260 L.7
("Some states limit home rule powers to local governments of a certain size, for
example; in addition, only thirty-seven states recognize some kind of home rule
for counties.").
255. See, e.g., Kevin J. Worthen, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Potential Normative
Power ofAmerican Cities and Indian Tribes, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1292 n.87 (1991)
(noting that "the minimum population requirement is generally small (between
2000 and io,ooo)" and that, "[i]n many jurisdictions, home-rule authority is
available for towns and villages, and for any city regardless of size").
256. See MICH. CONST. art. VII, § 22.
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2. Allowing for a Limited Number of Deviations
If Congress permits local action but precludes state action on a given mat-
ter, it could place limits on the local action. For example, spurring innovation
might be important enough in the context of a particular substantive statutory
program that Congress is willing to permit local deviation-but it may choose
to permit only a certain number of local governments to experiment. By doing
so, Congress could gain some of the benefits of innovation while minimizing
the impacts on federal uniformity and on state sovereignty.5 7
3. Specifying Time Limits on State-Local Divergences
Congress also could place a limited time period on any divergence it creates
between state and local authority. Such a limit, for example, could permit local
experimentation for five years. Doing so would eventually level the playing field
for state and local governments. Congress could reap the benefits of local exper-
imentation while avoiding the otherwise bizarre result of forbidding states from
taking advantage of useful local discoveries.
B. Judicial Presumptions for When "State" Means "State" or "State and Lo-
cal"
What can courts do to supplement the project of differentiation at the heart
of this Article? Courts certainly play an important role in the federal preemp-
tion universe.5' Here, I focus on the rules that courts should apply when Con-
257. Cf ZIMMERMAN, supra note 9, at io6 (describing examples of "limited congres-
sional preemption" in which the statutory provision "removes the authority of
subnational governments to engage in regulatory actions affecting a specified por-
tion of a regulatory field"); Christen Linke Young, Note, Pay or Play Programs and
ERISA Section 514: Proposals for Amending the Statutory Scheme, 10 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 197, 233 (2010) ("[T]here are models in the modern
administrative system that begin by preempting state law but nonetheless allow
states and localities to advance their own regulatory interests on a federal-
ly-controlled playground.").
258. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 11, at 737; Sharpe, supra note 11, at 369 ("Institutional,
cultural, and litigant demands for clarity and consistency all but force the Court
to step into the preemption-policymaking void often left by Congress."); Ryan D.
Newman, Note, From Bivens to Malesko and Beyond: Implied Constitutional Rem-
edies and the Separation of Powers, 85 TEx. L. REV. 471, 511-12 (20o6). Congress
cannot anticipate every situation in which federal law should or should not
preempt state or local law. See, e.g., Gasaway, supra note 216, at 29-30; Merrill, su-
pra note II, at 754 (noting that Congress preemptively would have to "analyze and
interpret the common law and statutory rules of fifty states and thousands of mu-
nicipalities"-an undertaking that is "beyond impossible"). And Congress has
been shown to be unresponsive to the Court's preemption decisions, so courts




gress does not specify the desired outcomes for both state and local regulation
in express preemption provisions. The best option, and the one toward which
the Court already might lean, is to apply two separate presumptions-one for
preemption clauses and one for savings clauses.
i. "State" Means "Only State" in Preemption Clauses
Courts could develop a "state-means-only-state" plain-statement rule for
preemption clauses-the clauses that trump subfederal authority. Such a rule
would require Congress to make its desired outcomes for local regulation as
clear as it makes its desired outcomes for state regulation. When Congress does
not so specify, courts could adhere to the plain meaning of the statutory text.259
Therefore, if Congress declares that it seeks to preempt, say, state regulation of
power-plant siting, but does not mention local regulation of power-plant siting,
the courts would presume that local governments could continue to regulate.
By adopting the "state-means-state" rule for preemption clauses, courts can be
seen as "prodding" (or "pleading" with) Congress as "a corollary to the more
traditionally emphasized function of checks and balances.""'o
Requiring Congress to be clear before preempting subfederal legislation
would adhere to the black-letter presumption against preemption that requires
a plain statement of congressional intent before preempting state or local law.
If, instead, courts applied the Mortier-Ours Garage "state-means-state-and-
local" rule to preemption clauses,21 local laws would be preempted in the face
of congressional silence on local outcomes, undermining the presumption.
Additional benefits of applying a plain-statement rule to the presumption
against preemption clauses follow. If, as a result, Congress deliberates more ex-
tensively about local authority or drafts more specific provisions, notice to state
and local governments would increase. Section III.D outlined the various bene-
New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Con-
gressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1604, 1626 (2007) (finding that Congress rarely reacts to the Court's preemption
decisions). Courts also help safeguard state sovereignty and local power through
protections such as the presumption against preemption. See Verchick & Mendel-
son, supra note 22, at 18-19, 21.
259. This rule would draw on a canon of statutory construction: inclusio unius est ex-
clusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing suggests the exclusion of others). Such
canons "can be defended if they generate greater objectivity and predictability in
statutory interpretation." William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Can-
ons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 678-79 (1999).
260. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in
an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354 (2011) (developing these concepts
in the climate-change context).
261. See City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432
(2002) (quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607 (1991)); supra
Section I.B.
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fits of increased notice, such as enhanced political safeguards and more efficient
engagement of states and localities. If Congress becomes more specific, the risk
of judicial interpretive error would decrease,262 and debate on difficult questions
would become more prevalent. 6 3 Congress could produce more finely tuned,
thoughtful regulation that accommodates state and local differences ex ante.26 4
Finally, such a rule would provide a symbolic recognition of the importance
and place of local regulation.
I should note that it may be worth calling the default rule a "presumption"
to soften its effect and make it more appropriately flexible. Moreover, a rigid
rule might not be required given that the standard rules of statutory interpreta-
tion already limit (if not obviate) the risk of courts badly misinterpreting con-
gressional intent.
2. "State" Means "State and Local" in Savings Clauses
On the other hand, the current Mortier-Ours Garage default rule discussed
in Part I might continue to be the most appropriate rule for savings-clause pro-
visions.6 5 When Congress is unclear in preemption provisions about whether
the term "state" includes the local, courts will presume that it does, or at least
that the state retains its power to delegate its authority to local governments.26
This rule also accords with the presumption against preemption. Again, as
the Court declared in Mortier and repeated in Ours Garage, " [M]ere silence ...
262. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had found that it was "abundantly clear" that
Congress intended to "preempt local, but not state, regulation" when it ruled on
the meaning of FIFRA's preemption clause-and then the U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously reversed. Mortier v. Town of Casey, 452 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Wis. 1990),
rev'd, 501 U.S. 597 (1991); see also Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs
Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 186 (noting that both pro- and an-
ti-preemption errors are possible).
263. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 136, at 108 ("[Sicholars, jurists, and others have increas-
ingly focused on the effect that interpretive methodology can have on the legisla-
tive process-both in terms of encouraging or discouraging ideal legislative be-
havior and in terms of the ease with which citizens and those to whom citizens
turn for counsel ('the relevant audience') can ascertain the law.").
264. Id.
265. I do not propose any changes to the conflation axiom, the rule considered in Part
I that mandates equal treatment of the state and the local in federal preemption
cases. But more work could be done to evaluate whether courts are impermissibly
violating this rule.
266. Indeed, some have argued for a plain-statement requirement for all preemption
cases, doing away entirely with implied preemption or at least with some of its
strands. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 110-11 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Young, supra
note 21, at 265-66. Others seek to strengthen the presumption against preemption
in the absence of clear congressional intent. See Hills, supra note 145.
376
30 : 321 2012
PREEMPTION CONFLATION
cannot suffice to establish a clear and manifest purpose to pre-empt local au-
thority."26 7 Therefore, silence in a savings clause on local regulation should
weigh in favor of including the local in the state (nonpreemption), while silence
regarding local regulation in a preemption clause should weigh in the opposite
direction.
C. The Participation of Regulatory Agencies
Finally, what can federal regulatory agencies offer? Congress might not al-
ways be best positioned to take detailed information into account about varia-
tions among local governments or between local and state governments. 68
Agencies can partner with Congress and perform some of the legwork of
state-local differentiation. 9 A comparative agency strength includes its
fact-finding capabilities and some degree of representativeness. 270 Moreover,
letting agencies do the differentiation could provide political cover for Con-
gress. This suggestion enters new territory. Scholarship on federal regulatory
agencies and preemption, as with the literature on preemption in Congress, the
judiciary, and federalism more generally, does not focus on agency interaction
with local governments, especially not from a comparative (state versus local)
perspective.
For example, if Congress were to specify that cities could perform some
types of regulation that states could not, Congress might have one kind of city
267. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432 (2002)
(quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607 (1991)).
268. Cf Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for
Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, io FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 274
(2005) (discussing Congress's failure to gain "expertise on highly specialized mat-
ters of substantive law and regulation").
269. This is not to say that agencies are flawless partners. There is the ever-present
threat of capture. Agencies also can have trouble monitoring the effects of their
decisions. See, e.g., Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a
Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293 (2007) (discussing the
literature on agency action and noting, for example, that agencies do not always
adjust future behavior based on data from past decisions); Alejandro E. Camacho,
Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources Management, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1405, 1414-17 (2011) (same). Data collection could be even more difficult at
the local level, given the number of local governments and the challenges of data
collection.
270. See Merrill, supra note ii, at 755 (arguing that agencies are better fact-finders and
better than Congress at evaluating the impact on uniformity and diversity); see al-
so Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1949-61
(2008) (evaluating Congress, the courts, and agencies according to the transpar-
ency of their actions); cf Paula A. Sinozich et al., Project: The Role of Preemption in
Administrative Law, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 107, 113 n.18, 116 (1993).
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and one kind of state in mind-say, Cheyenne and Wyoming, not Chicago and
Illinois or Los Angeles and California. The result could be crude and potentially
error-ridden legislation. 7 ' Regulatory agencies, on the other hand, might be
able to take such variations into account. They could do so in the rules they
promulgate, when engaging in regulatory preemption, or when providing feed-
back to Congress.
Regulatory agencies have experience with differentiation.2 73 For example,
certain Federal Railroad Administration regulations preempt local but not state
speed limits. 7 4 The FCC has preempted local but not state regulation.2 5 And a
court held that while FRSA's savings clause (which mentioned only the "state")
did not protect local involvement, HMTA regulations "recognize[] the possibil-
ity of local involvement. "76 Indeed, when rejecting a preemption challenge to
New York City's routing regulations for tank trucks carrying hazardous wastes,
271. See Spence & Murray, supra note 79, at 1190-91 (discussing examples of unintend-
ed consequences).
272. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1441, 1468 n.117 (2008) (noting that about twenty percent of the cas-
es examined involved agency preemption); Merrill, supra note ii, at 727 (recom-
mending the consideration of agencies to supplement the judiciary's norm articu-
lation). The literature in the debate as to what degree of preemptive power
regulatory agencies should have is enormous, so I provide merely a few examples.
Compare Young, supra note 21, at 268, with William Funk, Preemption by Federal
Agency Action, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 3, at 214, 215-17. See also, e.g.,
Colo. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571 (ioth Cir. 1991) (comparing
agency with judicial competence); Merrill, supra note n1, at 728-29 (summarizing
the controversy); David C. Vladeck, Preemption and Regulatory Failure Risks, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 3, at 54, 54.
273. Cf Young, supra note 21, at 233-35 (proposing an active role for agencies in decid-
ing whether state and local health-care initiatives are preempted by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act).
274. See Hotchkiss v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 88-1884, 1990 WL 70700, at *3
(6th Cir. May 29, 1990) ("Federal courts that have considered the issue have con-
cluded that these speed regulations establish a maximum speed limit and preempt
local, but not state, speed limits . . . .").
275. See, e.g., Nicholas P. Miller & Joseph Van Eaton, Local Communities and Commu-
nications Networks: Key Issues 2oo8, CABLE TELEVISION LAW 2008: COMPETITION
IN VIDEO, INTERNET, & TELEPHONY, at 93-94 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 14,173, 2008) (expressing
skepticism of the FCC's authority to do so).
276. Consol. Rail Corp. v. City of Bayonne, 724 F. Supp. 320, 326, 327-28 (D.N.J. 1989)
(noting that the Federal Railroad Safety Act's (FRSA) savings provision "only al-
lows for 'state' regulation of and participation in railroad safety," and that, while
"[nlo provision is made for political subdivisions," the HMTA "recognizes the





the Second Circuit concluded that "[tihe Secretary has not issued, and cannot
practicably issue, specific routing requirements for localities, whose own agen-
cies are very likely far better equipped to do so," despite Congress's "goal of na-
tional uniformity when it enacted the HMTA." '"
Moreover, federal regulatory programs already are tasked with evaluating
the effects of federal decisions on both state and local authority. A 1999 execu-
tive order required agencies to consider the impacts of preemption decisions on
state and local governments.7' A recent federal executive memorandum indi-
cated this same desire to have regulatory agencies evaluate impacts. It directed
agencies to preempt state law only after conducting a "full consideration of the
legitimate prerogatives of the States[,] ... with a sufficient legal basis for
preemption," and when "justified under legal principles governing preemp-
tion."2 79 Recognizing both state and local contributions, an executive memo-
randum issued in early 2011 "instruct[ed] agencies to work closely with state,
local, and tribal governments to achieve greater administrative flexibility and
lower administrative burdens from federal requirements."'So Finally, the Un-
funded Mandates Reform Act requires that "[e]ach agency shall ... assess the
effects of Federal regulations on States, local governments, [and] tribal govern-
ments" and "identify and consider a reasonable number of regulatory alterna-
tives," selecting the "least costly.""'
Federal agencies also evaluate and approve subfederal proposals to partici-
pate in federal programs."'2 Adopting such interactive approaches could help
alleviate a potential concern levied against the proposals here: that Congress
could permit action by local governments that lack the resources and technical
sophistication to carry out their plans. For example, regulations promulgated
pursuant to the EPA's authority under RCRA and the related Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 describe the process by which states can im-
plement their own programs to regulate hazardous waste.113 To receive approv-
277. Nat'l Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. City of New York, 677 F.2d 270, 275 (2d Cir.
1982).
278. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,256 (Aug. 4, 1999).
279. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed.
Reg. 24,693, 24,693 (May 20, 2009); Metzger, supra note 124, at 594 (quoting the
directive); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, no MICH. L.
REV. 521, 528-29 (2012) (discussing the effects of the memorandum).
280. Metzger, supra note 124, at 594 (citing President Obama, Government Reform for
Competitiveness and Innovation, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,273, 14,273 (Mar. n1, 2011)).
281. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1532, 1535 (2oo6).
282. Cf Sharpe, supra note n1, at 370-71 (discussing an agency delegation model that
"consciously embraces and encourages dialogue among Congress, the Court, fed-
eral administrative agencies, states, and interest groups, while also minimizing the
need for preemption policymaking by the judiciary").
283. See Requirements for Authorization of State Hazardous Waste Programs, 40
C.F.R. § 271 (2011); EPA, INTRODUCTION TO STATE AUTHORIZATION TRAINING
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al, a state program must be, inter alia, "equivalent to and at least as stringent as
the Federal rules" and must "[c]ontain[] adequate enforcement authority."14
Still other examples abound. Under the CAA, if a state or local government
wants to implement certain parts of the statute, the EPA will look at the pro-
posed policy and the ability of the entity to fund, enforce, and otherwise carry
out the program. For example, Philadelphia's Air Management Services Agen-
cy"' was "delegated the authority to implement and enforce the provisions of [a
federal regulation] on behalf of EPA."" The local authority operates in tandem
with state approval, in part relying on state distinctions among "classes" of local
governments."'
CONCLUSION
This Article takes the prevailing assumption that state-local differences are
irrelevant to federal preemption and shows that, at the very least, this story is
incomplete. Congress differentiates between the state and the local in the text of
statutory preemption provisions, as do the courts in default rules and in decid-
ing cases. But neither explains why. That failure impedes the development of
the best federal law possible, creates confusion over whether both local and state
governments can regulate given matters, increases the chance of judicial error,
and reduces the stature of local law.
I suggest a framework that Congress can employ to consider state-local dif-
ferences systematically, weighing state and local strengths against a set of rele-
vant considerations. I also identify mechanisms for the courts and federal agen-
cies to support these efforts in a systematic, dynamic, and iterative manner.
While local governments, as a constitutional matter, are no more important to-
day than at the Framing, their contributions to our polity are coming into
sharper focus. The percentage of the population that lives in major cities has
grown, the complexity of local government structures has increased, and local
regulatory innovation continues to spread into new areas. At the same time,
preemption is an increasingly robust and high-profile yet undertheorized area
of law. Congress is enacting preemption provisions at a fast clip, and courts are
MANUAL, at 1-3, available at http://www.epa.gov/osw/laws-regs/state/revision/
training/final-manual.pdf.
284. Id. at 1-8.
285. See Air Management Services, CITY PHILA., http://www.phila.gov/health/
airmanagement/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
286. See Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans, 48 Fed.
Reg. 31,638 (July n1, 1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52 (2011)).
287. See, e.g., Agreement for Implementation of the Philadelphia County Air Pollution
Control Program, at 1, available at http://www.dep.state.pa.us/dep/deputate/
airwaste/aq/permits/docs/philadelphia plan-approval.pdf (describing the





addressing preemption challenges at a correspondingly high rate. Understand-
ing the place of the local within federal preemption is that much more signifi-
cant. This Article provides the first roadmap for navigating this evolving legal
terrain.
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Appendix A: Preemption Clauses
Statute Provisions that Provisions
Preempt Both State that Preempt
and Local Regulation Only State
Regulation
Atomic Energy Act of 1954
42 U.S.C. §5 2011 to 2297g-4 (2006 & Supp.
2011)
Clean Air Act 5 7543(a) (20o6) 5 7543(a)





Clean Water Act § 1370()(B) (20o6) --
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2006 & Supp. 2011)
Comprehensive Environmental Response, § 9621(e)(1) (2006) § 9614(b)
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (2oo6)
42 U.S.C. 55 9601-9675 (2006 & Supp. 2011) 5 9658(a)(1)
Federal Hazardous Substances Act Pub. L. No. 89-756, --
15 U.S.C. §5 1261-1278 (2006) sec. 4, 80 Stat. 1303,
1305 (1966)
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro- -- § 136v(b)
denticide Act (2006)
7 U.S.C. §5 136-136y (20o6 & Supp. 2011)
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 -- 5 20o6 (2006)
49 U.S.C. §5 20101-21311 (2006 & 2010)
Federal Power Act
16 U.S.C. §5 791-825r (20o6)
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act § 5125(a) (2006 & 5112(b)(1)
49 U.S.C. §5 5101-5128 (2006 & Supp. 2010) Supp. 2010) (2006 &
§ 5125(b) Supp. 2010)
Interstate Commerce Commission Termi- § 14501(a)(1) (20o6) --
nation Act § 145o1(b)(1)
49 U.S.C. 55 100lo-11908 (20o6) § 14501(c)(1)
§ 14501(d)
Occupational Safety and Health Act
29 U.S.C. §5 651-678 (2006)
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 6929 (2006 & Supp. --
of 1978 2011)
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (2006 & Supp. 2011)
Toxic Substances Control Act §5 2617(a)(2)(A)-(B) --




Appendix B: Savings Clauses
Statute Provisions Mentioning Provisions Pro-
Both State and Local tecting Only State
Regulation Regulation
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 § 2018 (2006) § 5851(h) (2006)
42 U.S.C. §5 2011 to 2297g-4 § 2021(k)
Clean Air Act § 7412(r)(11) (2006) § 7 4 12(d)( 7 )
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q § 7416 (2006)
§ 7 4 29(h)(1) § 7429(h)(2)§ 7543(d) § 7507




Clean Water Act § 1370(1) (20o6) § 1251(g) (20o6)
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 § 1370(2)
Comprehensive Environmental Re- -- § 9614(a) (2006)
sponse, Compensation, and Liability § 9 652(d)
Act of i98o § 9 659 (h)
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
Federal Hazardous Substances Act Pub. L. No. 89-756, sec. --
15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278 4, 80 Stat. 1303, 1305
(1966)
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and -- § 136v(a) (2006)
Rodenticide Act § 136v(c)(1)
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 -- § 20106(a)(2)
49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-21311 (2006)
§ 201o6(b)
Federal Power Act -- § 821 (2006)
16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825r
Hazardous Materials Transportation § 5125(e) (2oo6 & Supp. § 5125(c) (20o6 &
Act 2010) Supp. 2010)
49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5128
Interstate Commerce Commission § 14501(c)(2)(C) (2006) § 14501(a)(2)
Termination Act of 1995 § 14501(c)(3) (20o6)
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. § 14 501(b)(2)
§ 14501(c) (2)(A)
Occupational Safety and Health Act -- § 667(a) (2006)
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
Resource Conservation and Recov- § 6929 (2006 & Supp. § 6929 (2006 &
ery Act of 1978 2010) Supp. 2010)
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
Toxic Substances Control Act § 2617(a)(1) (2006) --
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 § 2617(a)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)
§ 2617(b)
383

